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INTRODUCTION
A perennial topic in corporate governance literature is the
accountability of officers and directors for their management of the publicly
held corporation. Despite decades of debate concerning best approaches to
preventing unethical behavior by corporate officers1 or proposals for options
to improve corporate governance,2 wrongdoing within corporations
continues unabated. Examples abound, which cut across industries,
involving nearly every aspect of corporate fiduciary duties.3 Investigations
of sexual harassment at Uber,4 insider trading at Equifax,5 fraudulent

1. See, e.g., Andrew Stark, What’s the Matter with Business Ethics, HARV. BUS. REV.,
May–Jun. 1993, https://hbr.org/1993/05/whats-the-matter-with-business-ethics [https://perm
a.cc/7GZM-KJ4A] (stating that the work of business ethicists suffers from being too general,
too theoretical, and too impractical); see also Lynn S. Paine, Managing for Organizational
Integrity, HARV. BUS. REV., Mar.–Apr. 1994, https://hbr.org/1994/03/managing-for-organiza
tional-integrity [https://perma.cc/ZAT8-NAN8] (highlighting the difficulty of ensuring
proper corporate governance).
2. See, e.g., Joel F. Henning, Federal Corporate Chartering for Big Business: An Idea
Whose Time Has Come, 21 DEPAUL L. REV. 915, 918 (1972) (arguing for consideration of a
federal charter requirement for the big corporations to better control corporate power and
enhance accountability); see also Merritt B. Fox, Required Disclosure and Corporate
Governance, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 113, 116–19 (1999) (arguing that while requiring
disclosure is important for investor protection, it is more important for corporate governance
as related to shareholder voting and enforcement of managers’ fiduciary duties).
3. See Fiduciary Duty, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1991) (defining a fiduciary
duty as “a duty to act for someone else’s benefit, while subordinating one’s personal interest
to that of the other person); see also Adam Barone, What Are Some Examples of Fiduciary
Duty?, INVESTOPEDIA (May 4, 2019) https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/042915/wh
at-are-some-examples-fiduciary-duty.asp [https://perma.cc/5T64-RQEU] (defining fiduciary
duty as “a legal term describing the relationship between two parties that obligates one to act
solely in the interest of the other”). Some fiduciary duties typically include the duties of care,
loyalty, good faith, and disclosure. Fiduciary Duty, LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, https:
//www.law.cornell.edu/wex/fiduciary_duty [https://perma.cc/L7XL-ZNCU] (last visited June
9, 2019).
4. Uber to pay $1.9M for sexual harassment claims, BBC NEWS (Aug. 22, 2018),
https://www.bbc.com/news/business-45266954 [https://perma.cc/H7RZ-SJRL].
5. See Liz Moyer, Former Equifax executive charged with insider trading for dumping
nearly $1 million in stock ahead of data breach, CNBC (Mar. 14, 2018), https://www.cnbc.c
om/2018/03/14/former-equifax-executive-charged-with-insider-trading-ahead-of-data-breac
h.html [https://perma.cc/RBL7-AWD9] (discussing internal failures of corporate governance
in Equifax resulting in the inability to detect insider trading); Tara Siegel Bernard, Another
Equifax Employee Faces Charge of Insider Trading After Big Breach, NY TIMES (June 28,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/28/business/equifax-insider-trading-sec.html [http
s://perma.cc/WK2F-YLR6] (illustrating the continued prevalence of internal issues in Equifax
concerning insider trading).
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customer accounts at Wells Fargo,6 misuse of customer data by Facebook,7
price collusion for generic drugs,8 banking fraud at Goldman Sachs,9 and
emissions cheating by Volkswagen10 are but a few examples.
Historically, there have been two traditional approaches to
organizational integrity.11 The first is the use of compliance-based ethics
programs designed to deter and prevent legal violations.12 These include, for
example, existing compliance systems based on corporate criminal law, the
transparency and certification requirements of Sarbanes-Oxley, or other
statutory-based requirements.13 Another primary mechanism for compliance
accountability is the enforcement of fiduciary duties through shareholder
derivative litigation.14 However, in the United States it is extraordinarily
difficult for shareholders to enforce fiduciary duties such that it is widely
understood that they do not serve as a strong restraint on corporate
malfeasance.15 To remedy this perceived problem, the corporate governance
6. Ben Lane, Court approves Wells Fargo’s $480 million settlement for allegedly lying
about fake accounts, HOUSINGWIRE (Dec. 19, 2018), https://www.housingwire.com/articles
/47757-court-approves-wells-fargos-480-million-settlement-for-allegedly-lying-about-fakeaccounts [https://perma.cc/74HM-XHYB].
7. Mark Snider, Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg: ‘My mistake’ for abuse of voter info,
USA TODAY (Apr. 9, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2018/04/09/face
book-continues-data-misuse-investigation-suspends-two-more-firms/498266002/ [https://per
ma.cc/RB26-3P33].
8. Mark Terry, At Least 16 Generic Drug Companies And 300 Drugs Target of PriceFixing Investigation, BIOSPACE (Dec. 10, 2018), https://www.biospace.com/article/at-least16-generic-drug-companies-and-300-drugs-target-of-price-fixing-investigation/ [https://per
ma.cc/DK2P-WSCE].
9. Roomy Khan, Goldman Sachs An Unwitting Villain? 1MDB and Rogues: It Takes
More Than One To Tango, FORBES (Jan. 23, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/roomykha
n/2019/01/23/goldman-sachs-an-unwitting-villain-1mdb-and-rogues-it-takes-more-than-one
-to-tango/#42d90a141343 [https://perma.cc/64TC-NWQ6].
10. Hiroko Tabuchi, Jack Ewing, and Matt Apuzzo, Six Volkswagen Executives Charged
as Company Pleads Guilty in Emissions Case, NY TIMES (Jan. 11, 2017), https://www.nytim
es.com/2017/01/11/business/volkswagen-diesel-vw-settlement-charges-criminal.html [https:
//perma.cc/LV9W-XMYW].
11. Lynn S. Paine, Managing for Organizational Integrity, HARV. BUS. REV., Mar.–Apr.
1994, https://hbr.org/1994/03/managing-for-organizational-integrity [https://perma.cc/ZAT8
-NAN8].
12. Id.
13. See discussion infra Section I(A).
14. See George S. Geis, Shareholder Derivative Litigation and the Preclusion Problem,
100 VA. L. REV. 261, 268–71 (2014) (discussing how the shareholder derivative lawsuit
operates as corporate governance mechanism).
15. See, e.g., Kelli A. Alces, Debunking the Corporate Fiduciary Myth, 35 J. CORP. L.
239, 240 (2009) (referring to corporate fiduciary duties as “little more than a fiction” such
that “the relationship among corporate officers, directors, and the firm should no longer be
characterized as a fiduciary one”).
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literature is replete with proposals for how accountability of officers and
directors can be enhanced through modifications to shareholder derivative
litigation mechanisms.16
The second traditional approach to organizational integrity is referred
to as an integrity-based system,17 also commonly known as values-based
ethics.18 Aside from the above-noted compliance-based mechanisms, many
corporations have also sought to instill ethics compliance cultures within
their organizations through self-regulation.19 These types of programs have
ballooned since the U.S. Federal Sentencing Guidelines were amended in
1991.20 These guidelines provide for a mitigation of criminal penalties if a
corporation has adopted and implemented an effective ethics and compliance
program.21 Because of this substantial incentive, surveys have found that
most companies, particularly large ones, have a compliance program led by
a Chief Compliance Officer.22
Yet, despite compliance and ethics-based efforts, the current mix of
self-regulation and existing compliance requirements does not appear to be
effective in achieving its goals. The sheer number of ethics violations by
16. See, e.g., Megan Shaner, The (Un)Enforcement of Corporate Officer Duties, 48 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 271, 321 (2014) (proposing reforms to shareholder derivative litigation to
enhance their enforcement); see also John Matheson, Restoring the Promise of the
Shareholder Derivative Suit, 50 GA. L. REV. 327, 388 (2016) (proposing a federal statute that
provides uniform standards regarding shareholder derivative litigation to make such litigation
more effective).
17. Paine, supra note 11.
18. See Linda K. Treviño, Gary R. Weaver, David G. Gibson & Barbara L. Toffler,
Managing Ethics and Legal Compliance: What Works and What Hurts, 41 CAL. MGMT. REV.
131, 131–151 (1999), https://doi.org/10.2307/41165990 [https://perma.cc/6JPU-G47R].
19. See, e.g., Compliance and Ethics at Microsoft, MICROSOFT, https://www.microsoft.c
om/en-us/legal/compliance/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/M2H6-N9MZ] (last visited Jan. 1,
2020) (describing Microsoft’s Compliance and Ethics Program, including standards and
reporting procedures); Code of Conduct Handbook, FORD MOTOR COMPANY, https://corporate
.ford.com/content/dam/corporate/en/company/corporate-governance/COC-Handbook_Publi
c-Vsn_CURRENT_english_11082017.pdf [https://perma.cc/R2VB-ZCB5] (last visited Jan.
1, 2020) (setting forth Ford Motor Company’s corporate policies and procedures related to
ethics and compliance); The Spirit & The Letter, GENERAL ELECTRIC, https://www.ge.com/in
/sites/www.ge.com.in/files/TheSpirit&TheLetter.pdf [https://perma.cc/F24G-NVFG] (last
visited Jan. 1, 2020) (setting out GE’s code of conduct, including procedures related to ethics
and compliance).
20. See Sean J. Griffith, Corporate Governance in an Era of Compliance, 57 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 2075, 2083–88 (2016) (discussing the impact of the Organization Sentencing
Guidelines on corporate compliance).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 2102 (citing a Price Waterhouse Coopers’s survey finding that while 69% of
the respondents had a Chief Compliance Officer, this number increased to 88% for large
companies and 86% for companies in highly regulated industries).
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corporations remains high and Americans’ confidence in big business
remains low. It continues to flat-line at around twenty percent, dropping
from twenty-eight percent in 1997.23 Moreover, big business is the fourth
least-trusted major institution in the U.S. according to a 2018 survey.24 Put
simply, existing mechanisms are not working effectively.
This article seeks to add to the literature in this area by proposing an
entirely different mechanism for officer and director accountability. We
argue that given the realities of the modern public corporation, current
corporate governance, ethics, and compliance mechanisms are inadequate.
Thus, we propose that the solution to enhancing officer and director
accountability requires re-conceptualizing the accountability mechanism
itself. We propose that ethical corporate management could be better
achieved through a federal Office of Corporate Ethics, similar to the Office
of Government Ethics, with the power to set corporate governance and ethics
standards for officers and directors of publicly held companies and enforce
them via corrective and disciplinary actions, including fines and injunctions.
The structure of this proposed office is based upon characteristics of
professional oversight boards used to oversee learned professions as well as
the Office of Government Ethics that sets standards for government
employees. We argue that such an office would provide enhanced
accountability to officers and directors by treating them as quasiprofessionals who are accountable not just to shareholders, but to other
stakeholders and society as a whole, to manage publicly held corporations
competently and ethically.
Section I discusses existing accountability mechanisms for corporate
officers and directors and analyzes why they are inadequate given the
realities of the modern publicly held corporation. Section II discusses the
idea of treating the corporate manager as a professional with duties to society
as a whole, similar to doctors, lawyers, and other learned professions.
Section III describes the U.S. Office of Government Ethics as a model for
ethics compliance in large organizations, discussing the similarity between
ethical issues facing both executive branch employees and corporate officers,
and focusing on its monitoring, training, and personal accountability
23. See Frank Newport, Business Gets Bigger Even as Americans Prefer Small, GALLUP
(Aug. 22, 2017), https://news.gallup.com/opinion/polling-matters/216674/business-getsbigger-even-americans-prefer-small.aspx [https://perma.cc/B54V-X6NH] (noting that in
2017, 36% of Americans have “very little” confidence in big businesses but 70% have positive
confidence in small business).
24. See Niall McCarthy, The Institutions Americans Trust Most and Least in 2018,
FORBES (June 29, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/niallmccarthy/2018/06/29/the-instituti
ons-americans-trust-most-and-least-in-2018-infographic/#f7822762fc88 [https://perma.cc/R
C9M-WFYN].
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functions. Section IV provides our proposal for an Office of Corporate
Ethics that we believe addresses existing shortcomings and provides
enhanced accountability for officers and directors in a reasonable manner.
I. MANAGERIAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE MODERN PUBLICLY HELD
CORPORATION
In the United States, managers25 of publicly held corporations face
accountability for their managerial decisions at both the federal and state
levels.26 Incorporators can choose to form a corporation in any state they
wish.27 The corporate law of the state of incorporation regulates internal
corporate matters, including the scope of fiduciary duties owed to
shareholders.28 While there is little actual benefit to incorporating in
Delaware, Delaware continues to be the dominant state of incorporation,
largely for historical reasons.29 At the federal level, corporate governance
per se is not regulated, however many corporate governance-type issues are
tangentially regulated through the application of the federal securities laws.30
This section will discuss how corporate governance and ethics is regulated
at both of these levels and how true managerial accountability at each level
is lacking.
A. Corporate Governance and Ethics under Federal Law
With respect to publicly held corporations, the primary focus of federal
law is to regulate securities markets to protect investors and ensure the
25. In the context of this article we refer to the word “manager” loosely to include either
officers or directors when engaged in managerial decision making regarding corporate affairs.
26. See Arthur R. Pinto, An Overview of United States Corporate Governance in Publicly
Traded Corporations, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 257, 261–62 (2010) (describing the federalist nature
of corporate governance in the United States).
27. Id. at 262.
28. Id.
29. Id.; see also Robert Anderson IV & Jeffrey Manns, The Delaware Delusion, 93 N.C.
L. REV. 1049, 1052 (2015) (empirically researching the value added by Delaware’s corporate
law and determining that it has little effect on shareholder value, and that Delaware’s
dominance in corporate law is largely based upon “lawyers’ default decision making based
upon Delaware’s past preeminence”).
30. See Pinto, supra note 26, at 263–64 (discussing federal securities laws); see also
Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance:
Reflections upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859, 861 (2003) (empirically demonstrating
how most corporate governance regulation of the modern publicly held corporation takes
place through application of the federal securities laws).
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functioning of capital markets.31 While there are numerous federal laws that
impact publicly held corporations, the primary direct regulatory apparatus is
the 1933 Securities Act (“Securities Act”) and the 1934 Exchange Act
(“Exchange Act”), which include various registration, anti-bribery, and
accounting provisions.32 These laws, administered by the Securities and
Exchange Commission (“SEC”), primarily regulate securities markets
through a system of mandatory disclosure of information to investors and
anti-fraud provisions.33 The disclosure requirements of the federal securities
laws require publicly traded companies to provide public disclosure of
material information to investors on a continuous basis.34 This includes not
only the required annual and quarterly reports, but more immediate
disclosure of certain types of information when it occurs within these
periodic reporting periods.35 While there are other anti-fraud statutes and
regulations in the securities laws, the primary, and most frequently used,
anti-fraud provision is Rule 10b-5.36 Rule 10b-5 provides a broad cause of
action that applies to “any person” who engages in fraud or makes any untrue
statement or omission of a material fact in connection with the purchase or
sale of a security.37 This anti-fraud provision has been interpreted broadly
and can create immense liability for corporate officers or directors who make
a misleading or fraudulent statement regarding, or fail to disclose material
information related to, their company’s securities.38
At first blush these disclosure and anti-fraud requirements seem to have
little to do with corporate governance or ethics. They do not address ethical
corporate decision making and governance directly, other than to require the
disclosure of material, relevant information to the markets and not engage in
fraud. However, due to their broad use by the SEC, the Department of Justice
(“DOJ”), and private litigants, federal securities laws occupy an important
role in constraining officers and directors from unethical behavior in the
modern publicly held corporation.39 Additionally, in the wake of various
31. See About the SEC, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/about.shtml
[https://perma.cc/PYT2-W872] (“The mission of the SEC is to protect investors; maintain
fair, orderly, and efficient markets; and facilitate capital formation.”).
32. Pinto, supra note 26, at 263.
33. Pinto, supra note 26, at 263.
34. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.15d-1, 240.15d-13, and 240.15d-11 (setting forth disclosure
requirements for filing annual reports, quarterly reports on Form 10-Q, and current reports on
Form 8-K, respectively).
35. Id.
36. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
37. Id.
38. See Thompson & Sale, supra note 30, at 882–84 (discussing the breadth of 10b-5
liability and its use as a corporate governance mechanism).
39. See Thompson & Sale, supra note 30, at 882–84.
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financial crises and corporate scandals, federal securities laws have been
expanded to encroach upon areas of corporate governance and ethics
traditionally reserved for state regulation.40
1. SEC Civil Enforcement of Securities Laws
Under the Exchange Act, the SEC has the authority to seek both civil
monetary penalties as well as injunctive relief for violations of securities
laws and regulations.41 With a few exceptions, the SEC can use this
enforcement authority through filing an action in a federal district court or
through an administrative proceeding.42 This enforcement authority gives
the SEC significant power to regulate corporate misconduct; however, this
power is limited by the scope of federal securities laws as well as the
resources of the SEC.
The most recent Annual Report of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement
(for Fiscal Year 2018) discloses that the SEC brought 490 “stand alone” and
210 “follow on” enforcement actions.43 When the type of actions brought is
considered, this report shows the value of the SEC aggressively enforcing
violations of the securities laws but also illustrates the shortcomings of the
securities laws as a mechanism for regulating corporate ethics.
According to this report, the most common action brought by the SEC
in FY 2018 related to securities offerings violations (25% of enforcement
actions).44 These actions involve violations of the law in the offering of a
security, including fraudulent securities offerings and failure to register the
offering or comply with an exemption.45 Examples of these types of actions
given in this annual report include actions against issuers engaging in Ponzi

40. See, e.g., Roberta A. Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack
Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1523 (2005) (discussing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
and how it injected corporate governance into the securities laws); see also Stephen M.
Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank: Quack Federal Corporate Governance Round II, 95 MINN. L. REV.
1779, 1782–83 (2011) (discussing the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act).
41. See Steve Thel, Taking Section 10(b) Seriously: Criminal Enforcement of SEC Rules,
2014 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 10 (2014) (discussing the civil enforcement options of the SEC
for enforcing the Exchange Act and rules passed thereunder).
42. Id.
43. U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, DIV. OF ENF’T ANNUAL REPORT (2018), at 9, available
at https://www.sec.gov/files/enforcement-annual-report-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/KJ23RBDV] (stating that “stand alone” actions are original actions brought by the SEC for
violations of the securities laws, while “follow-on” actions seek bars based upon previous
Commission actions or actions by other criminal authorities or regulatory authorities).
44. Id. at 10.
45. Id.
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schemes and selling otherwise worthless or fraudulent investments.46 While
some of the actions brought within this category may be tangentially related
to corporate governance and ethical decision-making issues, most are related
to basic fraud or other legal violations in the offering of investments.47 The
second most common type of action related to investment
advisor/investment company violations (22% of enforcement actions).48
Another 13% of enforcement actions relate to broker-dealer misconduct.49
This means that 60% of the enforcement actions brought by the SEC were
either unrelated, or only tangentially related, to issues of ethics and corporate
governance in the ongoing management of a publicly traded company.50
To be sure, the SEC does take enforcement actions related to corporate
governance and ethics issues. For example, in 2018 the SEC instituted
administrative proceedings against Panasonic Corporation for a years-long
bribery scandal related to government aviation contracts in the Middle East.51
Panasonic entered into an offer of settlement with the SEC consenting to the
entry of an order finding violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,
various accounting and reporting violations, and violations of Rule 10b-5.52
Panasonic agreed to pay a fine of $143,199,018.93 and received a deferred
prosecution agreement from the Department of Justice for any criminal
violations.53 This case serves as an example of how the SEC can use its
enforcement powers to address quintessential corporate ethical misconduct.
Another common example of such enforcement is actions brought related to
insider trading, an issue of ethics involving breach of the duty of loyalty and
exploitation of shareholders.54 However, given the mission of the SEC and
its limited resources, these types of actions represent a minority of the SEC’s
enforcement efforts.55
This is not a criticism of the SEC or a suggestion that it should focus its
enforcement authority in any particular direction. Rather, we merely point
out the fact that the primary focus of the SEC is protecting investors and
ensuring that capital markets function properly and without fraud. This
46. Id. at 15.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 10.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Panasonic Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 3938, at 3–4 (Apr. 30, 2018), available
at https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2018/34-83128.pdf [https://perma.cc/DR3H-82VX].
52. Id. at 12.
53. Id.
54. See U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 43, at 10 (noting that 10% of the
enforcement actions brought by the SEC relate to insider trading).
55. See supra notes 43–50 and accompanying text.
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primary function may at times overlap with issues of corporate ethics.
However, any enforcement actions that also implicate managerial ethics
issues are ancillary to this primary goal. Furthermore, certain corporate
ethics issues, such as the pervasive sexual harassment alleged against
executives of Uber,56 fall almost entirely outside the purview of the SEC. To
expect more of the SEC in the area of ethics is arguably unreasonable given
the scope of important securities markets issues it is charged with regulating
and the limited tools at its disposal.
2. Private Securities Litigation
Private litigants can also sue for certain types of securities fraud,
namely under Rule 10b-5.57 As with SEC enforcement actions, private
securities litigation can be used as a deterrent to certain types of unethical
conduct or corporate mismanagement. However, private litigation has the
same limitations as SEC enforcement actions – it only addresses conduct that
fits within the strictures of the securities laws. While some corporate ethics
issues will fall within the ambit of the securities fraud statutes, some will
not.58 Additionally, private securities litigation is limited by the same
financial incentives behind all litigation – attorneys and plaintiffs will be
drawn to cases that are the most likely to create a substantial financial
windfall. This means that ethical misconduct that is not likely to result in a
large verdict is unlikely to be policed by private litigation. It also means that
the officers or directors that engaged in the conduct may not be held
accountable in any way if the corporation simply pays a sufficient sum to
settle the suit on their behalf. Additionally, misconduct or fraud that hurts
certain stakeholders but is either not required to be disclosed or is accurately
disclosed to the shareholders cannot be successfully litigated under Rule
10b-5.59 Thus, while private securities litigation is a tool that can help deter
some corporate malfeasance, just like the SEC’s civil enforcement of
56. Uber to pay $1.9M for sexual harassment claims, supra note 4.
57. See Thompson & Sale, supra note 30, at 882–84 (discussing the breadth of 10b-5
liability and its use as a corporate governance mechanism).
58. See supra text accompanying note 56.
59. See, e.g., Uber to pay $1.9M for sexual harassment claims, supra note 4. If the
management of a company has developed a culture of sexual harassment or otherwise of
treating employees in an unlawful or unethical way, as long as that conduct is either not
material and not required to be disclosed or is properly disclosed, no 10b-5 cause of action
would be possible because no fraud on the securities markets or shareholders would have
taken place. See Thompson & Sale, supra note 30, at 909 (noting “[i]f managers are truthful
about their shortcomings, the securities laws presumably offer no protection for breaches of
the duty of care, no matter how egregious”).
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securities laws, it is necessarily limited in its scope.60
3. Sarbanes-Oxley and Other Internal Governance Requirements
There has always been a tension between federal securities regulation
and state regulation of the internal affairs of the corporation.61 In theory, the
federal securities laws regulate securities markets and transactions, but
internal corporate affairs are left to the states to regulate through their
respective corporate statutes.62 However, since the early 2000s various
corporate scandals have led both the SEC and stock exchanges to impose
requirements that move federal regulation more directly into these corporate
governance matters traditionally reserved for the states.63 The most oft-cited
federal laws in this regard are the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (“SOX”) and the
Dodd-Frank Act (“Dodd-Frank”).64
Passed in the wake of the Enron and WorldCom corporate scandals,
SOX imposed new corporate governance-like requirements on publicly
traded companies.65 Broadly, these requirements mandate an audit
committee of independent directors; prohibit accounting firms from
providing non-audit services to companies they audit; prohibit companies
from extending loans to their executive officers and directors; require that a
company disclose whether or not it has adopted a code of ethics, and if not,
why not; and require executive certification of financial statements,
including a requirement that an external auditor assesses the internal controls
of the company.66 The most contentious section of SOX has been the
requirement of the audit of internal controls, as many critics have asserted
that it creates an undue expense for publicly traded companies without

60. See Thompson & Sale, supra note 30, at 909 (discussing how 10b-5 liability only
addresses disclosure under the securities laws, and not the wrong conduct itself, noting
“disclosure is, at best, a monitor of what managers say, not what they do. The two may be
linked only at the margin.”).
61. See Z. Jill Barclift, Codes of Ethics and State Fiduciary Duties: Where is the Line?,
1 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 237, 238 (2008) (noting the “history of discord” between
federal securities laws and the duties of managers under state fiduciary principles).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 238 (discussing the disclosure, certification, and codes of ethics requirements
of Sarbanes-Oxley and how they “further the tension between federal securities, and state
corporate law.”).
64. See Romano, supra note 40.
65. Romano, supra note 40.
66. Id. at 1529–40 (discussing the substantive requirements of SOX); see also 17 C.F.R.
§ 229.406 (2019) (setting forth regulation carrying out the SOX requirement of disclosure
regarding a code of ethics).
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commensurate benefit.67 Overall, SOX has been heavily criticized as an
ineffective, unnecessary burden on publicly traded companies as well as an
infringement on state regulation of internal corporate matters.68
Following the sub-prime lending crisis, the federal securities laws were
further extended into traditional corporate governance issues with the
passage of Dodd-Frank.69 Dodd-Frank was a voluminous piece of legislation
addressing a myriad of issues, with some provisions relating to corporate
governance and ethics issues, including:
1. A “say on pay” vote requiring non-binding shareholder advisory
votes on executive compensation;
2. Independent compensation committees on boards of directors;
3. Additional disclosure requirements related to executive
compensation;
4. Expansion of clawbacks of executive compensation when certain
securities laws are violated;
5. A requirement that the SEC create new shareholder access and
proxy rules;
6. Disclosure requirements regarding the CEO serving as the
chairman of the board.70
One commentator has referred to the disclosure provisions as
“therapeutic disclosures,” as they are not designed simply to inform investors
but to use the shame of the disclosure to shape corporate conduct.71 For
example, the added disclosures related to executive compensation require the
company to disclose a comparison of the CEO’s compensation to the median
compensation of all other employees.72 The clear goal of such a provision is
to force the disclosing company to highlight how much more the CEO makes
than “normal” employees and to cause embarrassment if this ratio is
extraordinarily high. However, Dodd-Frank does not create any type of
67. See Robert Prentice, Sarbanes-Oxley: The Evidence Regarding the Impact of SOX
404, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 703, 703–04 (2007) (discussing the controversy and criticism
surrounding the SOX 404 audit requirement).
68. See, e.g., Roberta A. Romano, Does the Sarbanes Oxley Act Have a Future?, 26 YALE
J. REG. 229, 243–54 (2009) (arguing that SOX has had an adverse impact on capital formation
in the United States); see also Stanley B. Block, The Latest Movement to Going Private: An
Empirical Study, 14 J. APPLIED FIN. 36, 37 (2004) (discussing an increase in companies going
private and arguing the most frequently cited reason for the decision was SOX compliance
costs).
69. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank: Quack Federal Corporate Governance
Round II, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1779, 1782–83 (2011) (discussing the passage of the Dodd-Frank
Act).
70. Id. at 1783.
71. Id. at 1797.
72. Id.
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standard for “excessive” compensation or any penalty related thereto.73 It
simply requires the disclosure. The same is true for the disclosure related to
whether or not the CEO also serves as the chairman of the board of
directors.74
Some of the requirements of Dodd-Frank are more substantive.
Pursuant to Dodd-Frank, the SEC has issued rules requiring the national
securities exchanges to require the board of directors of listed companies to
have a compensation committee composed of independent directors.75 The
goal of this requirement is to ensure that the directors who determine
executive compensation are free from conflicts of interest.76 Dodd-Frank
also provides for an enhanced scope of clawbacks of executive compensation
if financials are reported incorrectly and requires reporting companies to
have a non-binding advisory vote from shareholders on executive pay at least
every three years.77
The basic premise of these pay requirements is that managers have too
much control over the boards of directors who are supposed to oversee them
and that this has resulted in pay that is not adequately tied to actual
performance.78 The actual effect that these requirements will have on
executive compensation, and indeed whether “excessive” executive
compensation is even a problem, has been debated by scholars.79 What is
not up for debate is that the SEC’s role in traditional corporate governance
and ethics matters has been expanded in recent years. These expansions
invariably occur in response to corporate scandals with large economic
impacts that ultimately spring from issues of unethical and dishonest
behavior by executives and directors of publicly traded companies.
However, they tend to not address the core issues of ethical behavior, but
rather just address issues related to the scandal that occurred, and in arguably
superficial ways.

73. Id.
74. Id. at 1798.
75. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10C-1(a)–(b) (2019).
76. See Bainbridge, supra note 40, at 1805.
77. Bainbridge, supra note 40, at 1806–07.
78. Bainbridge, supra note 40, at 1809.
79. Bainbridge, supra note 40, 1808–09 (discussing the debate on executive
compensation and noting “the literature on this topic is immense.”); see also Bernice Grant,
Independent Yet Captured: Compensation Committee Independence after Dodd-Frank, 65
HASTINGS L.J. 761, 765–770 (2014) (discussing the scholarly debate regarding executive
compensation).
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4. Criminal Enforcement
The federal securities laws create criminal liability in addition to the
civil liability previously discussed.80 While the SEC enforces the civil
provisions of the securities laws, the DOJ prosecutes criminal violations.81
Violations of Rule 10b-5 fall within the scope of this criminal liability and
carry a potential sentence for natural persons of a fine not exceeding
$5,000,000 and a prison sentence not exceeding twenty years.82 The DOJ
enforces the criminal provisions of the SEC, as well as other economic and
corporate crimes, through its Fraud Unit.83 The Fraud Unit has sub-units
related to the enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”),
health care fraud, and securities and financial fraud.84 Both the FCPA and
securities and financial fraud units prosecute crimes which may be related to
issues of corporate ethics and governance, as they bear on fraudulent actions
taken by corporations and their management.85
Creating criminal liability for business decisions is understandably
controversial. It is generally understood that there are certainly “business”
actions that corporations or their agents can take that should be
criminalized.86 Blatant financial fraud, such as the Ponzi scheme conducted
by Bernie Madoff, certainly falls into this category, and few would argue that
such actions should not be criminal.87 However, it is also generally
understood that there is a risk of over-criminalizing business conduct that
could be better regulated either through private litigation or civil
enforcement.88 Business requires risk-taking, and criminalizing business
80. See Thel, supra note 41, at 6 (discussing the criminal provisions of the Exchange
Act).
81. Thel, supra note 41, at 6.
82. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (2019).
83. See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FRAUD UNIT ANNUAL REPORT (2018), at 2, https://www.justice
.gov/criminal-fraud/file/1123566/download [https://perma.cc/82FG-8LD9] (noting that the
Fraud Section “combats financial crime, foreign bribery offenses, and complex health care
fraud schemes in federal courts and across the country”).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See Ellen S. Podgor, White Collar Crime and the Recession: Was the Chicken or the
Egg First?, 2010 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 205, 206 (2010) (discussing white collar crimes
surrounding the 2008 financial crisis and noting the public acceptance of large criminal
sentences for such conduct).
87. See Felicia Smith, Madoff Ponzi Scheme Exposes the Myth of the Sophisticated
Investor, 40 U. BALT. L. REV. 215, 221–31 (2010) (discussing the multi-billion-dollar Madoff
Ponzi scheme, which resulted in a guilty plea by Madoff and a 150-year sentence).
88. See, e.g., George J. Terwilliger, Under-Breaded Shrimp and Other High Crimes:
Addressing the Over-Criminalization of Commercial Regulation, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1417–
18 (2007) (discussing the dangers and potential negative economic effects of over-
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decisions that are not clearly fraudulent can have a chilling effect on this
risk-taking that helps drive the economy.89 The line between aggressive
business decisions and wrongdoing is sometimes clear, but oftentimes is not,
making decisions to criminally prosecute business conduct controversial and
difficult.90 Furthermore, determining mens rea when multiple agents of a
corporation participate in decision making is notoriously difficult, and courts
have not articulated a consistent standard, making corporate criminal
prosecution challenging.91 These competing tensions make criminal
prosecution a relatively ineffective tool for addressing most corporate
governance and ethics issues.
The threat of criminal prosecution primarily affects corporate
governance and ethics through two mechanisms – the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines for Organizations (the “Guidelines”) and the DOJ’s use of
deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements.92 The Guidelines
were adopted in 1991, and they allow corporations to have criminal penalties
mitigated if they implement and maintain an effective corporate compliance
program.93 The Guidelines also provide guidance on what constitutes an
effective compliance program.94 While the Guidelines do not mandate that
corporations adopt a corporate compliance program, they provide a powerful
incentive to adopt such a program, and thus have a strong effect on the shape
of corporate compliance mechanisms in publicly traded corporations.
The DOJ also influences corporate compliance through its preference
for using agreements referred to as deferred prosecution agreements, nonprosecution agreements, or pre-trial diversion agreements (“PDAs”) in lieu
of criminal prosecution.95 In a typical PDA, the corporation avoids
criminalizing business).
89. Id.
90. Id. (discussing how the line between lawful pollution and criminal violations of
environmental law can be “razor thin, often expressed in parts per million, and the stuff of
great debate between experts and scientists”) (footnote omitted); see also Kip Schlegel, David
Eitle & Steven Gunker, Are White-Collar Crimes Overcriminalized? Some Evidence on the
Use of Criminal Sanctions Against Securities Violators, 28 W. ST. U. L. REV. 117, 118 (2000–
2001) (noting the controversy surrounding criminalizing white collar crime, including its
moral ambiguity in the minds of many).
91. See Erin L. Sheley, Tort Answers to the Problem of Corporate Criminal Mens Rea,
97 N.C. L. REV. 773, 780 (2019) (noting that U.S. courts have “created a loose and highly
controversial doctrine of entity liability that has bedeviled scholars and practitioners alike for
over a century”).
92. See Griffith, supra note 20, at 2083–85 (discussing the impact on corporate
compliance of the Organization Sentencing Guidelines and the increasing use of agreements
in lieu of prosecution).
93. Griffith, supra note 20, at 2084.
94. Griffith, supra note 20, at 2086.
95. See Jennifer Arlen & Marcel Kahan, Corporate Governance Regulation through
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prosecution and conviction by acknowledging facts that constituted a crime,
agreeing to cooperate with an investigation, waiving the right to a trial,
agreeing to certain penalties (typically monetary), and implementing (or
modifying an existing) corporate compliance program to try to deter future
misconduct.96 On their face, PDAs are not inherently bad and have some
notable upsides: the DOJ is able to essentially obtain an admission of guilt,
a fine, and a promise to make efforts to deter future wrongdoing without the
time and expense of a trial. Many times, the compliance undertaking
requires ongoing monitoring or auditing by a third party, hopefully
increasing the likelihood that the compliance efforts will be genuine and
effective.97 However, critics have noted significant problems with
mandating corporate compliance through PDAs.98
One obvious limit of PDAs is that they only impose ex post compliance
duties on a limited number of firms that have been found to be engaging in
illegal behavior.99 If the compliance mandates that are being made are
effective in deterring illegal conduct, then arguably a better option would be
to require the same (or similar) compliance undertakings for all publicly
traded companies.100 Of course, it could be that the compliance undertakings
mandated in PDAs are effective, but sufficiently costly that they should only
be imposed on firms that have engaged in a legal violation. But even if this
is the case, the fact still remains that corporate compliance mandates through
PDAs will only ever apply to a limited subset of companies.
This raises a second concern with the corporate compliance mandates
in PDAs – it is not at all clear that they are in fact effective.101 One inherent
problem with corporate compliance in general is that there are no accepted
Nonprosecution, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 323, 334 (2017) (noting how the use of PDAs has
“become federal prosecutors’ primary tool for imposing sanctions on publicly held firms for
many important offenses”) (internal citations omitted).
96. Id. at 334–35 (describing the usual PDA process and terms).
97. Id. at 337–38 (reviewing the terms of PDAs and noting that most PDAs require
ongoing reporting to the government and/or an outside monitor or auditor).
98. See, e.g., Miriam H. Baer, Too Vast to Succeed, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1109, 1114 (2016)
(reviewing a book on corporate PDAs and noting its author found that PDAs are “inconsistent,
uninformative, too short in duration, occasionally secret (or accompanied by side deals), and,
in Garrett’s opinion, collectively unsuccessful in deterring wrongdoing and holding corporate
actors accountable for the harm that they have caused”) (internal citations omitted).
99. See Arlen & Kahan, supra note 95, at 348 (“The primary distinguishing features of
PDA policing mandates are that they impose duties only on firms with detected wrongdoing
and do so in an ad hoc fashion.”) (internal citations omitted).
100. Arlen & Kahan, supra note 95, at 348 (“Ex ante rules are presumably superior
whenever it would be desirable to impose policing duties on a broader set of firms that
includes firms without detected wrongdoing.”).
101. See Griffith, supra note 20, at 2105–06 (discussing the general problem of
determining the effectiveness of compliance programs).
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metrics for determining whether a compliance program is actually
working.102 This problem is not unique to compliance mandates found in
PDAs, but it is compounded by the fact that these mandates are the product
of a criminal prosecutor’s judgment.103 Criminal prosecutors do not have
any particular expertise in managing corporate compliance, and there is no
reason to believe that they are the ideal authority to be guiding corporations
in developing and implementing an effective corporate compliance
program.104 Additionally, the DOJ gives prosecutors little to no guidance on
what compliance mandates should be included in a PDA, giving individual
prosecutors significant discretion in their design.105 This has led to criticisms
that these compliance mandates are not only potentially ineffective, but are
inconsistent across companies and oftentimes vague.106
This is not to say that criminal enforcement or PDAs mandating certain
compliance programs are entirely ineffective and should be done away with.
Such a conclusion is outside the scope of this article. The point is rather that
their inherent shortcomings make them of limited usefulness in incentivizing
general corporate managerial accountability and ethical management across
a broad swath of publicly traded companies.
B. Corporate Governance and Ethics through State Corporate Law
At least in theory, most corporate governance issues in the United States
are regulated at the state level. The existing structure of corporate
governance in the United States is based upon the premise that the publicly
held company fits the classic “Berle-Means” model.107 This model assumes
102. Griffith, supra note 20, at 2105 (discussing the difficulty in measuring compliance
effectiveness and noting “[m]oreover, many compliance metrics track activity rather than
impact, thereby demonstrating that compliance may be busy but not necessarily effective”)
(internal citation omitted).
103. See Arlen & Kahan, supra note 95, at 342–43 (noting that the DOJ does not supervise
prosecutors on PDAs nor provide them with clear guidelines for their content, thus giving
individual prosecutors enormous discretion on their terms).
104. See Griffith, supra note 20, at 2128 (noting that compliance officers are not sure what
works in compliance, and that “[i]f compliance officers cannot answer these questions
definitively, there are very good reasons to suppose that generalist prosecutors who are not
embedded in the day-to-day operation of the subject firm cannot answer them either”).
105. Arlen & Kahan, supra note 95, at 342–43.
106. Baer, supra note 98, at 1114; see also Griffith, supra note 20, at 2129 (“It is not
surprising then that prosecutors’ compliance demands are occasionally vague, requiring firms
to conduct ‘appropriate due diligence,’ build ‘effective compliance,’ and periodically review
compliance in light of current standards, all without supplying specific content.”) (internal
citations omitted).
107. See Matheson, supra note 16, at 329 (discussing a seminal article written by Adolph
Berle and Gardiner Means identifying that the separation of ownership and control and the
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that the corporation has numerous shareholders that own a stake in the
corporation, officers and directors manage this corporation on behalf of these
shareholders, and the goal of corporate law is to reduce the agency costs
inherent in this structure.108 These agency costs include managerial shirking,
incompetence, and putting managers’ own interests above those of the
shareholders.109 Since ownership of the publicly held company is typically
diffusely held, the ability of the shareholders to oversee officers and directors
via the shareholder vote is incredibly difficult, and thus other mechanisms of
accountability to reduce these agency costs and police executive malfeasance
are necessary.110 Shareholders commonly use the shareholder derivative suit
as a tool to attempt to enforce this accountability and reduce agency costs.111
In a typical shareholder derivative suit, one or more shareholders sue one or
more officers or directors on behalf of the company for breaching their
fiduciary duties owed to the company.112 Whether fiduciary duties enforced
through shareholder derivative litigation are an effective tool to encourage
good corporate governance and ethical behavior is a matter of much debate.
Scholars have extensively studied the effectiveness of shareholder
derivative litigation as a corporate governance mechanism.113 Most of this
research has led to the conclusion that shareholder derivative suits are a very
ineffective accountability mechanism.114 This is largely due to procedural
different interests of owners and managers as the primary problem of corporate governance
in the publicly held corporation).
108. Matheson, supra note 16, at 329.
109. Matheson, supra note 16, at 329.
110. See Jill Fisch & Simone M. Sepe, Shareholder Collaboration, TEX. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2019), https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/1996/?utm_sourc
e=scholarship.law.upenn.edu%2Ffaculty_scholarship%2F1996&utm_medium=PDF&utm_c
ampaign=PDFCoverPages [https://perma.cc/F4XP-AADW] (noting that for much of
corporate history, shareholders have been “dispersed and passive, with few mechanisms to
overcome collective action problems”).
111. See Jessica M. Erickson, Overlitigating Corporate Fraud: An Empirical
Examination, 97 IOWA L. REV. 49, 53 (2011) (noting that shareholder derivative lawsuits are
“among the most common type of private corporate fraud lawsuit” and that at times
outnumber other types of shareholder litigation).
112. See Matheson, supra note 16, at 344 (“A derivative action allows shareholders to
bring a suit against directors or officers in the name of the corporation itself. The shareholders
seek to enforce a right of action belonging to the corporation, which it might have asserted,
but did not.”) (internal citations omitted).
113. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation without Foundation?, 7
J. L. ECON. & ORG. 55, 84 (1991) (conducting an empirical analysis of shareholder derivative
suits and concluding that “[t]he data support the conclusion that shareholder litigation is a
weak, if not ineffective, instrument of corporate governance”).
114. Id.; see also Stephen J. Choi, Jessica Erickson & A.C. Pritchard, Piling On? An
Empirical Study of Parallel Derivative Suits, 14 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 653, 654 (2017)
(studying 264 shareholder derivative suits and shareholder class actions suits filed in parallel
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requirements that make these lawsuits difficult to bring and the application
of the business judgment rule.
While the exact procedure can vary by state, the basic procedural
impediment is that shareholders are typically required to make a demand to
the board of directors to file a shareholder derivative suit on the behalf of the
company before it can be filed by a shareholder.115 This requirement exists
because the board of directors is the body who is actually charged with
overseeing the management of the company on behalf of the shareholders,
and thus has the right to decide whether it is in the best interest of the
company to bring the lawsuit.116 Upon receiving a demand from the
shareholders, the board of directors is charged with conducting an
investigation of the shareholders’ claim and determining whether the
corporation should pursue it.117 Of course, typically one or more of the
members of the board of directors is a party charged with breaching fiduciary
duties owed to the company, so the board is essentially being asked to
determine whether it should allow itself to be sued by the corporation.118
This is a difficult hurdle to overcome, and in most jurisdictions the
shareholders must either try to sue without making a demand and
subsequently prove that demand would have been futile, or file the lawsuit
after the board of directors has determined it is not in the best interests of the
corporation to file it and convince the court that the board of directors’
determination was incorrect.119 Pursuing the latter course can be very
difficult because of the substantial deference given to the board’s conclusion,
as long as the conclusion was made by disinterested directors.120
with securities fraud class actions and finding that they add little value to the already filed
securities fraud class action suits); see also Erickson, supra note 111, at 92–98 (finding that
lawsuits alleging corporate fraud tend to be filed in parallel and overlap, and that shareholder
derivative suits do not appear to serve a substantial role in policing conduct not already
covered by other corporate fraud actions).
115. See Matheson, supra note 16, at 357 (discussing the board demand requirement of
shareholder derivative suits).
116. Matheson, supra note 16, at 357 (“Since a derivative suit is a claim on behalf of the
corporation, it is a corporate asset and should be subject to the control and management of the
board of directors.”).
117. Matheson, supra note 16, at 358.
118. Matheson, supra note 16, at 358 (“In most derivative cases, the shareholder is seeking
to hold some or all of the current board members liable for breach of their fiduciary duties.
Since it is these very same people upon who the shareholder is supposed to make a demand,
shareholders understandably can be reluctant to ask the directors to sue themselves.”).
119. Id. at 360 (discussing the demand futility requirement); see also, e.g., TEX. BUS.
ORGS. CODE ANN. §§ 21.554, 21.558 (West 2019) (allowing disinterested directors or
committees of directors to investigate derivative claims and require their dismissal upon the
determination that bringing the suit is not in the best interest of the corporation).
120. Id. § 21.558(b) (placing the burden of proof on the plaintiff to prove that the
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The second impediment has to do with the substantial deference given
to managers and boards of directors in business decision-making through the
“business judgment rule.”121 Shareholder derivative suits typically assert that
one or more officers or directors have violated their fiduciary duty of care.
This fiduciary duty is often articulated as the “amount of care which
ordinarily careful and prudent men would use in similar circumstances.”122
However, when evaluating claims for breach of this duty courts apply the
business judgment rule, which creates a presumption that the directors and
officers “acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief
that the action was taken in the best interests of the company.”123 Thus,
absent some showing of gross misconduct or fraud, the business judgment
rule essentially insulates officers and directors from most fiduciary
liability.124 This presumption is so powerful one commentator has referred
to it as an “abstention doctrine” by which the courts have decided they will
abstain from questioning decisions made by officers and directors.125
There are certainly strong arguments for this rule to exist – business
decision-making is incredibly difficult and entails a significant risk of
failure.126 Thus, if officers and directors were held liable as fiduciaries for
simply making bad decisions, then very few individuals would want to
manage corporations or would at least be very risk averse in their decisionmaking.127 Additionally, there is no reason to believe that courts or
determination of the disinterested directors was either not in good faith or was not based upon
a reasonable inquiry).
121. See David Millon, Two Models of Corporate Social Responsibility, 46 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 523, 527 (2011) (“Under the business judgment rule, courts will not second-guess
decisions—including decisions that appear to benefit nonshareholders at the expense of
shareholders—as long as management can assert some plausible connection with the
corporation’s long-run best interests.”).
122. See, e.g., Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963).
123. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
124. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57
VAND. L. REV. 83, 128 (2004) (“The court beings with a presumption against review. It then
reviews the facts to determine not the quality of the decision, but rather whether the decisionmaking process was tainted by self-dealing and the like. The requisite questions to be asked
are more objective and straightforward: Did the board commit fraud? Did the board commit
an illegal act? Did the board self-deal? Whether or not the board exercised reasonable care is
irrelevant, as well it should be.”).
125. Id. (referring to the business judgment rule as a doctrine of abstention and noting
“[t]he business judgment rule thus builds a prophylactic barrier by which courts pre-commit
to resisting the temptation to review the merits of the board’s decision.”).
126. Id. at 110–15 (discussing the significant risks that managerial decisions necessarily
entail and how the business judgment rule gives room for risk-taking).
127. Id. at 109 (noting the tension between authority and accountability in board decision
making and concluding, “Given the significant virtues of discretion, however, one must not
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shareholders have expertise superior to directors such that they can better
discern good decisions from bad, and a bad financial outcome does not
necessarily mean that a bad decision was made.128 Both legislatures and
courts have determined that our economy is best suited by keeping courts out
of the business of second-guessing business decisions, and this policy
decision is likely a sound one.129 Nevertheless, the result of this policy
decision is that it is very difficult to successfully sue officers and directors
for breach of fiduciary duty.
These impediments have led commentators to assert that fiduciary
duties functionally do not exist in United States corporate law, nor do they
serve an important role in policing misconduct.130 Moreover, when
shareholder derivative suits are filed against public companies, they tend to
be filed in parallel with corporate fraud actions (such as securities fraud)
which have already been filed.131 Thus, shareholder derivative suits usually
are not detecting and deterring any misconduct that is not already being

lightly interfere with management or the board’s decision-making authority in the name of
accountability. Preservation of managerial discretion should always be the null hypothesis.”);
see also Kelli A. Alces, Debunking the Corporate Fiduciary Myth, 35 J. CORP. L. 239, 250
(2009) (“Delaware courts do not want to discourage profitable risk-taking or keep worthy
candidates from becoming corporate directors for fear that they will be personally bankrupted
on account of business decisions that are deemed unsuccessful with the benefit of hindsight.”).
128. See Bainbridge, supra note 124, at 119 (noting that one argument for the business
judgment rule is that judges generally lack business expertise, or at least have less business
expertise than directors or managers).
129. See David A. Wishnick, Corporate Purposes in a Free Enterprise System: A
Comment on eBay v. Newmark, 121 YALE L.J. 2405, 2412 (2012) (“One of the deep principles
animating Delaware corporate law is respect for private ordering.”); see also Bainbridge,
supra note 124, at 109 (noting the tension between authority and accountability in board
decision making and concluding, “Given the significant virtues of discretion, however, one
must not lightly interfere with management or the board’s decision-making authority in the
name of accountability. Preservation of managerial discretion should always be the null
hypothesis.”).
130. See, e.g., Alces, supra note 127, at 281 (“Corporate governance relationships are no
longer fiduciary. Delaware law has narrowed the scope of corporate fiduciary duties to the
extent that they now only serve to address very specific and limited misbehavior by corporate
officers and directors.”); see also Erickson, supra note 111, at 91 (“When viewed through the
lens of parallel litigation, shareholder derivative suits appear poised to play a meaningful role
in deterring corporate directors, a role that other types of corporate litigation do not play. Yet
the substantive law in shareholder derivative suits undercuts this deterrence function. Indeed,
the substantive law may reinforce the idea that derivative suits are frivolous. It is extremely
difficult for shareholders to allege a viable claim, so most claims inevitably fall short, which
in turn bolsters the belief that these suits lack merit.”).
131. Erickson, supra note 111, at 88 (“It is far more typical for corporate malfeasance to
spark numerous parallel lawsuits, of which the shareholder derivative suit is typically the least
successful.”).
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litigated through other means.132 Furthermore, because of the procedural and
substantive law issues noted above, shareholder derivative suits are less
likely to be successful in holding the defendants accountable for the alleged
misconduct.133 Thus, the end result is that shareholder derivative suits tend
to be nothing more than a method to over-litigate fraudulent conduct that is
already being more effectively regulated through other legal mechanisms,
such as securities fraud actions.134
C. Conclusion
Ultimately, the current corporate law landscape is a patchwork that
tends to over-litigate certain types of fraudulent and unethical conduct (such
as securities fraud),135 but leaves substantial gaps for other types of unethical
conduct. These state and federal regulatory regimes do impose a degree of
accountability on publicly held corporations and their managers, but they fail
to comprehensively address corporate ethical misconduct and leave
substantial regulatory gaps.
For example, a corporate executive may enable, contribute to, or even
direct a pattern of discriminatory hiring practices or sexual harassment
within the corporation. While such conduct might be unethical and violate
anti-discrimination laws, under the current legal regime most legal actions
arising therefrom will be settled by the corporation. Unless the conduct is
especially egregious, there is a good chance the corporate official responsible
will not suffer any substantial personal consequence. The enforcement
mechanism of the SEC would almost certainly not be triggered, because
sexual harassment does not fall within the ambit of securities fraud.136 This
conduct might conceivably be caught in the net of shareholder derivative
litigation based upon fiduciary duties, but for the reasons set forth above,
shareholder derivative litigation is not an effective accountability
132. Erickson, supra note 111, at 88.
133. Erickson, supra note 111, at 91.
134. Erickson, supra note 111, at 98 (“In the end, shareholder derivative suits represent
the search for a needle in a haystack. The needle may be the egregious case of corporate
misconduct that falls through the cracks of other types of corporate fraud litigation, or it may
be the rare case that inspires the court to write a decision that will shape boardroom practice
for years to come. As the data make clear, however, the vast majority of shareholder
derivative suits do not fall into either of these categories. Within the haystack of corporate
fraud litigation lies a significant number of shareholder derivative suits that neither
compensate corporations nor deter corporate fraud.”).
135. Erickson, supra note 111, at 98.
136. See discussion supra Section I(A) (discussing that the primary focus of federal
securities laws is to protect investors through a system of mandatory disclosures and antifraud provisions).
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mechanism and likely cannot be made to be one.137 Furthermore, unless the
employment misconduct creates loss of profits or stock value for the
shareholders, they are unlikely to police it closely.
Of course, the argument could be made that since the individuals who
have been wronged by the discriminatory conduct have legal recourse
through filing an employment discrimination lawsuit, there is no societal
harm created that is not already being addressed. However, we would argue
that given the scope of impact that publicly held corporations have in a
modern society, unethical conduct by their highest levels of management has
spillover effects that other stakeholders have an interest in. As an example,
other employees and candidates for employment have an interest in unethical
managers that harass employees being removed from positions of power in
publicly held corporations as opposed to their indiscretions being settled in
private litigation on a piecemeal basis. Existing corporate accountability
mechanisms fail to look in a comprehensive way at business as a societal
force that affects more than just the parties directly engaged in business
transactions.
For instance, while the Exchange Act provides a very broad remedy of
a permanent injunction against serving as an officer or director of a publicly
traded company, that remedy is necessarily limited to certain violations of
the securities laws.138 While this is the type of broad societal remedy we
advocate, we argue that such remedies need to encompass a larger scope of
unethical corporate behavior to be an effective accountability mechanism.
Instead, existing corporate law focuses on compliance with very specific
laws and the managers’ duties to a very specific group – shareholders.
This focus is not necessarily misplaced – shareholders are a critically
important stakeholder group and in most regulatory contexts, it makes sense
that they are the focus of accountability efforts. However, it is our contention
that the limited focus of existing corporate accountability mechanisms is
inadequate given the scope of societal impact that unethical corporate
management now has and the nature and structure of the modern corporation.
Given these realities, we contend that corporate accountability can be
enhanced by reforms that focus on treating officers and directors of publicly
traded companies similarly to doctors, lawyers, and other learned professions
with ethical duties that extend outside of their direct clients and transactions.
137. See discussion supra Section I(B) (discussing that procedural hurdles, including the
demand requirement and the business judgment rule standard of review, make shareholder
derivative suits ineffective).
138. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-3(f) (2019) (providing for a temporary or permanent officer and
director bar for violations of section 78j(b) of the Exchange Act or any of its rules or
regulations).

946

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 22:4

In the next section, we will discuss this concept of the business manager as
a professional.
II. THE CORPORATE MANAGER AS A PROFESSIONAL
Academics in the area of business education have long debated whether
business management is a learned profession or just an academic area of
study.139 This debate had its genesis in the early years of the Industrial
Revolution, as salaried managers of corporations began to appear as a
powerful societal force.140 As the need for corporate managers grew, the
university-based business school was developed to train these future
managers.141 The business school was originally conceived of as a type of
professional education, similar to law or medicine, in which trainees were
being prepared to practice a learned profession for the benefit of society.142
However, as both business education and corporate management developed
in society, these original ideas of professionalism were ultimately abandoned
in favor of pure economic logic – that managers are merely agents of
shareholders tasked with carrying out the management of a corporation for
the shareholder’s economic benefit.143 However, there are modern
commentators that assert that society would be benefitted by returning to
thinking of corporate management as a learned profession.144
In this section, we will discuss and evaluate this ongoing debate
regarding the nature of management. Ultimately, we conclude that there are
some critical differences between corporate management and learned
139. See RAKESH KHURANA, FROM HIGHER AIMS TO HIRED HANDS 6 (2007) (discussing
the beginnings of business education and its original conception as a type of education for a
learned profession, like medicine or law).
140. Id. at 3 (“When salaried managers first appeared in the large corporations of the late
nineteenth century, then began to proliferate, it was not obvious who they were, what they
did, or why they should be entrusted with the task of running corporations.”).
141. Id. at 6–7 (discussing the origins of the business school).
142. Id. at 7 (discussing the professional origins of the business school and noting, “This
notion comprised, among other things, a social compact between occupations deemed
‘professions’ and society at large, as well as a certain set of relations among professional
schools, the occupational groups for which they serve as authoritative communities, and
society.”).
143. Id. (“In the course of history, the logic of professionalism that underlay universitybased business school in its formative phase was replaced first by a managerialist logic that
emphasized professional knowledge rather than professional ideals, and ultimately by a
market logic that, taken to its conclusion, subverts the logic of professionalism altogether.”).
144. See Rakesh Khurana, Why Management Must be a Profession, HARV. BUS. REV. (July
20, 2010), https://hbr.org/2010/07/why-management-must-be-a-profe [https://perma.cc/C4Z
3-PWPN] (discussing the impact that corporate management has on society and concluding,
“Business schools themselves have the responsibility to make management a profession”).
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professions like law or medicine, which prevent it from being treated in
exactly the same way. However, we argue that there are important aspects
of corporate management that make it very similar to a learned profession,
such that it could be regulated as a “quasi-profession.” First, we address the
basic attributes of a profession and discuss whether they apply to corporate
management.
Researchers have identified four key attributes of a learned profession:
1. A common body of knowledge resting on a well-developed,
widely accepted theoretical base;
2. A system for certifying that individuals possess such
knowledge before being licensed or otherwise allowed to
practice;
3. A commitment to use specialized knowledge for the public
good, and a renunciation of the goal of profit maximization, in
return for professional autonomy and monopoly power; and
4. A code of ethics, with provisions for monitoring individual
compliance with the code and a system of sanctions for
enforcing it.145
In recent years, commentators have engaged in a lively debate
regarding whether these attributes apply to corporate managers.146 We
will not fully rehash this debate here. Rather, we will analyze whether
each of these points can reasonably be applied to business management.
Ultimately, we conclude that they do not perfectly map to business
management. However, there is substantial overlap and important
similarities.
A. A Common Body of Knowledge and a System of Licensing and
Certification
Because the first two elements of a profession are inextricably related,
we will address them together. Learned professions, such as law and
145. See Rakesh Khurana, Nitin Nohria & Daniel Penrice, Is Business Management a
Profession?, HARV. BUS. SCH.: WORKING KNOWLEDGE (Feb. 21, 2005), https://hbswk.hbs.ed
u/item/is-business-management-a-profession [https://perma.cc/7SZ2-52SJ].
146. Id. at 6 (arguing for the professionalization of corporate management based upon
these attributes). But see Ben W. Heineman, Jr., Management as a Profession: A Business
Lawyer’s Critique, HARV. BUS. REV. (Nov. 2, 2010), https://hbr.org/2010/11/management-asa-profession-a-b [https://perma.cc/H3FX-GSGF] (arguing that analogizing business
management to the legal profession is misguided); see also Richard Barker, The Big Idea: No,
Management is not a Profession, HARV. BUS. REV. July-Aug. 2010, at 52–60 (arguing that
“[l]audable and beguiling though professional standards and ethics may be, and however
appealing professional status is, hanging the mantle ‘professional’ on business education
fosters inappropriate analysis and misguided prescriptions”).
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medicine, typically have an accepted common body of knowledge that
practitioners of the profession are expected to possess.147 This is why
specific professional schools have arisen, along with their own accrediting
agencies, to train individuals for these professions.148 These professions also
have certification and ongoing education requirements that their
practitioners must comply with.149 These elements of a learned profession
are difficult to apply directly to the management of public corporations.
At first blush, it would appear that there is clearly a common body of
knowledge related to business management. The goal of legitimizing
business management as a profession by developing such a common body of
knowledge was part of the driving force behind the creation of business
schools.150 Certainly the proliferation of MBA programs, as well other
masters and doctoral degrees in business, would lend credence to the idea
that there is a common body of knowledge undergirding the practice of
business management.151
The problem with this argument is that “business” is a very broad
discipline composed of disparate sub-disciplines. For example, public
accounting is a sub-area of business which constitutes its own learned
profession with its own certifying body.152 There are certain careers in
finance and investing which also have their own certifications, some legally
required and some not.153 However, the broad area of corporate management
147. See Khurana, Nohria & Penrice, supra note 145, at 2 (discussing the bodies of
knowledge developed in the fields of law, medicine, and the clergy).
148. Khurana, Nohria & Penrice, supra note 145, at 2.
149. See Khurana, Nohria & Penrice, supra note 145, at 2. (discussing the certification and
ongoing education requirements for practicing law or medicine).
150. See KHURANA, supra note 139, at 49 (discussing the development of university based
business schools in the United States as an exercise in attempting to obtain legitimacy for the
growing numbers of corporate managers and to put this new occupation on par with
established professions like law, medicine, and the clergy).
151. See Accredited Universities and Business Schools, AACSB.EDU, https://www.aacsb.
edu/accreditation/accredited-schools [https://perma.cc/EZ8Z-AHU5] (last visited Jan. 6,
2020) (holding its spot as the lead accrediting body of schools of business, the AACSB claims
862 institutions in fifty-six countries are accredited by the AACSB); see also Top 10 MBA
Programs in the US 2019, TOPMBA.COM (Sept. 25, 2018), https://www.topmba.com/mbarankings/full-time-mba-rankings-north-america/top-10-mba-programs-us-2019
[https://perma.cc/M9RT-LAEM] (noting that in one survey, of the best 250 MBA programs
worldwide, 109 of them were in the U.S.).
152. See CPA Licensure, AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS,
https://www.aicpa.org/becomeacpa/licensure.html [https://perma.cc/FN3C-YTB3] (last
visited Jan. 6, 2020) (discussing CPA licensure, which includes education and examination
requirements).
153. See, e.g., CFA Program, CHARTERED FINANCIAL ANALYST INSTITUTE, https://www.c
fainstitute.org/programs/cfa [https://perma.cc/7AX8-RQWF] (last visited Jan. 6, 2020)

2020]

THE U.S. OFFICE OF CORPORATE ETHICS

949

is different. It requires some knowledge and familiarity with sub-disciplines
such as accounting, finance, and marketing, but does not inherently require
intimate knowledge of their practice.154 Management is ultimately about
leading people in an organization, and one can lead people who are
knowledgeable in an area without having sufficient knowledge to practice
that discipline. For example, an individual might be an excellent Chief
Executive Officer but not have sufficient knowledge of accounting to
recreate all of the financial statements the company uses. If the company
has good, trustworthy people managing the accounting function, the CEO
does not necessarily need to be an expert in accounting to be a good, ethical
business manager.
Furthermore, the ability needed to lead an organization can come from
a variety of sources and does not easily permit itself of a common body of
knowledge with a certification requirement. This conclusion is evidenced
by the reality that numerous successful public companies have been led by
individuals with no formal business education.155 Additionally, each
business is different. The knowledge and skills needed to manage a large
pharmaceutical company will likely be substantially different than the
knowledge and skills needed to run a publishing or media company. One
could imagine a world in which some sort of exam and licensing requirement
could be required of individuals before they could serve as an officer or
director of a public corporation, but it is difficult to think of what such a test
would consist of and how it would serve the same gate-keeping function that
a bar exam or medical board examination would.
Ultimately, business management is quasi-professional in that there is
an academic discipline that has studied and developed theories about it.
However, these theories are not sufficiently developed such that there can
truly be said to be a “right” way to run a business. Obtaining an education
in business management can be very helpful in running a business, but it

(discussing the Chartered Financial Analyst professional designation, which is not legally
required but highly desirable for finance professionals); see also Series 7 – General Securities
Representative Exam, FINANCIAL INDUSTRY REGULATORY AUTHORITY, https://www.finra.o
rg/registration-exams-ce/qualification-exams/series7 [https://perma.cc/U84Z-SD27] (last
visited Jan. 6, 2020) (setting out the Series 7 examination requirements, which is a required
licensure to serve as a representative of a securities broker-dealer in the United States).
154. See Barker, supra note 146 (“In general, the professional is an expert, whereas the
manager is a jack-of-all-trades and master of none—the antithesis of the professional.”).
155. Well known examples of this are Bill Gates and Mark Zuckerberg, both of whom
dropped out of college. See Jonathan Wai and Heiner Rindermann, The Myth of the College
Dropout, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT (Apr. 20, 2017), https://www.usnews.com/news/n
ational-news/articles/2017-04-20/bll-gates-mark-zuckerberg-and-the-myth-of-the-college-dr
opout [https://perma.cc/R5MP-TRGA].
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cannot be said to be necessary in the way that a medical or law degree is
necessary to practicing those professions. For example, there are certain
aspects of human anatomy and biology that a medical doctor simply must
know to practice medicine. Likewise, a lawyer must know something about
civil procedure in order to be a competent attorney. As a society, we have
determined that given the difficulty and importance of these fields, a formal
course of study and a licensing requirement is the best method for ensuring
competency of their practitioners. That determination seems eminently
logical. It is difficult to argue that the same can be said of the management
of a public corporation given the myriad types of businesses that exist and
methods that can be used to successfully manage them.
B. A Commitment to Use Specialized Knowledge for the Public Good
A key aspect of a learned profession is the understanding and
commitment that the specialized knowledge of that profession should be
used for the public good.156 For example, lawyers owe special ethical duties
to the court system as a whole that transcend the duties owed to their specific
client.157 Likewise, doctors owe ethical duties to society in general, and not
just to their own patients.158
These societal duties have at times been framed as a call to shun the
maximization of profit in engaging in these professions and to consider them
as “service” professions.159 For example, prior to a Supreme Court ruling
holding that commercial speech was protected under the First Amendment,
lawyers were generally barred from advertising their services, as it was
considered to be denigrating to the service orientation of the profession.160
In modern times, it is understood that engaging in these learned professions
does not require shunning profits.161 It is widely understood that practicing
law or medicine is a lucrative career, and it is professionally appropriate to
156. See Khurana, Nohria & Penrice, supra note 145, at 2.
157. See, e.g., TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. tit. 2, subtit. G, app. B, § 3.03 (2019) (imposing
ethical duties on lawyers to have candor towards tribunals).
158. See, e.g., Code of Medical Ethics Opinion 8.3, AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION,
https://www.ama-assn.org/delivering-care/ethics/physicians-responsibilities-disaster-respons
e-preparedness [https://perma.cc/M5J7-5VPK] (last visited Jan. 6, 2020) (imposing an ethical
duty for physicians to be involved in responses to disasters, even “in the face of greater than
usual risks to physicians’ own safety, health, or life”).
159. See Khurana, Nohria & Penrice, supra note 145, at 2.
160. See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 383 (1977) (holding that blanket
restrictions on all attorney advertising violated the First Amendment).
161. See Heineman, Jr., supra note 146 (“In fact, law firms for more than a generation
have been moving from loosely managed associations of professionals to disciplined business
organizations.”).

2020]

THE U.S. OFFICE OF CORPORATE ETHICS

951

advertise one’s services and seek to make a profit. Society no longer
considers the profit motive and professional ethics to be inherently
contradictory. However, there is an understanding that professional
obligations transcend the profit motive. For example, a lawyer is expected
to be a zealous advocate for his client, but regardless of how much a client
is willing to pay, a lawyer cannot present evidence to a court that the lawyer
knows to be false.162
These same principles can be transferred relatively well to the
“profession” of business management. Generally, corporate officers and
directors are expected to seek to manage their business in such a way as to
make a profit for their shareholders.163 In this sense, one could argue that
this means they can’t be considered professionals who owe broad societal
duties. However, lawyers and doctors both have clients and patients to
whom they owe specific duties that differ from those owed to society as a
whole. Society accepts that this does not excuse these professionals from
owing general ethical duties to society; it simply means that these
professionals must exercise judgment when these rights seemingly come in
conflict. We argue that the same can be applied to business management.
To the extent there is no direct conflict, there is no logical inconsistency in
expecting corporate managers to consider the societal good along with their
fiduciary duties to shareholders when managing publicly traded companies.
A group of 181 CEOs of publicly traded companies recently affixed
their signatures to a statement from the Business Roundtable affirming this
principle.164 This statement affirms that each separate company serves its
own corporate purpose, but that companies should also seek to benefit
society as a whole.165 Some of the specific stakeholders referenced in this
statement are employees, communities, the environment, and suppliers.166
Notably, this statement does not reject capitalism or free market principles,
nor does it expressly reject the principle of shareholder wealth maximization,
162. See, e.g., TEX GOV’T CODE ANN. tit. 2, subtit. G, app. B, § 3.03(a)(3) (2019) (“A
lawyer shall not knowingly . . . offer or use evidence that the lawyer knows to be false.”).
163. See Katz v. Oak Indus., Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del. Ch. 1986) (“It is the obligation
of directors to attempt, within the law, to maximize the long-run interests of the corporation’s
stockholders; that they may sometimes do so ‘at the expense’ of others (even assuming that a
transaction which one may refuse to enter into can meaningfully said to be at his expense)
does not for that reason constitute a breach of duty.”).
164. Business Roundtable Redefines the Purpose of a Corporation to Promote ‘An
Economy That Serves All Americans’, BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE (Aug. 19, 2019), https://www
.businessroundtable.org/business-roundtable-redefines-the-purpose-of-a-corporation-to-pro
mote-an-economy-that-serves-all-americans [https://perma.cc/B46V-SEJ5].
165. See id. (“While each of our individual companies serves its own corporate purpose,
we share a fundamental commitment to all of our stakeholders.”).
166. Id.
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but rather affirms that these goals can be pursued while still being cognizant
of the needs of stakeholders besides shareholders.167 The acceptance of this
statement by numerous CEOs provides evidence that perhaps society and
business managers are ready to hold executives of public companies
accountable to the same type of commitment to societal good as we do other
learned professions. We argue that such a commitment, if framed in a
reasonable way, does not jeopardize the soundness of a free market economy
focused on profits.
C. A Code of Ethics
The final element common to learned professions is an established code
of ethics.168 For example, both the legal and medical professions have
specific codes of ethics to which licensed professionals in those fields are
held.169 Practitioners who fail to adhere to these ethical standards run the
risk of censure, including losing the right to practice their profession.170
Currently, no such code of ethics exists for business managers. Due to
exchange listing requirements, most publicly traded companies do have their
own code of ethics.171 However, enforcement of this code is left to that
particular company, and there is no professional board with authority to
enforce business ethics. We argue that this is an area of professionalism that
can, and should, be applied to business management. While there is certainly
disagreement among business management professionals on numerous
167. See id. (“We believe the free-market system is the best means of generating jobs, a
strong and sustainable economy, innovation, a healthy environment and economic
opportunity for all.”).
168. See Khurana, Nohria, & Penrice, supra note 145, at 2.
169. See, e.g., Code of Medical Ethics overview, AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, https
://www.ama-assn.org/delivering-care/ethics/code-medical-ethics-overview [https://perma.cc/
D6UT-9XQF] (showing the AMA Code of Medical Ethics, which applies to physicians as
members of the medical profession); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. tit. 2, subtit. G, app. B (2019)
(enumerating a code of legal ethics for barred attorneys).
170. See, e.g., Punishment for Professional Misconduct, TEX. BAR ASS’N, https://www.
texasbar.com/Content/NavigationMenu/ForThePublic/ProblemswithanAttorney/GrievanceE
thicsInfo1/MisconductPunishment.htm [https://perma.cc/LBE6-6FXU] (setting forth the
punishment attorneys may receive for misconduct, including disbarment).
171. See NASDAQ Equity Rule 5610, http://nasdaq.cchwallstreet.com/nasdaq/main/nasd
aq-equityrules [https://perma.cc/87NK-TADD] (requiring NASDAQ listed companies to
have a code of conduct that satisfies the definition of a “code of ethics” from the Sarbane
Oxley Act; see also NYSE Listing Manual Rule 303A.10, https://nyse.wolterskluwer.cloud/l
isted-company-manual/document?treeNodeId=csh-da-filter!WKUS-TAL-DOCS-PHC-%7B
0588BF4A-D3B5-4B91-94EA-BE9F17057DF0%7D--WKUS_TAL_5667%23teid-78 [https
://perma.cc/XK6Y-D8BR] (requiring NYSE listed companies to adopt and publicly disclose
their “code of business conduct and ethics”).
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issues, it should be easy to reach consensus on many core ethical issues such
as duties of loyalty, conflicts of interest, bribery, compliance with applicable
laws, and fraud. At least with respect to broad ethical principles, we argue
that the professional standard of an enforced code of ethics is easily
applicable to business management.
D. Conclusion – Business Management is a Quasi-Profession
Ultimately, in our opinion there are aspects of professionalism that map
well to business management and aspects that do not. Business management
does not lend itself well to a licensing requirement. Numerous entrepreneurs
from various educational backgrounds and walks of life develop business
ideas, bring them to fruition, and continue to manage them well as publicly
traded companies. The art of managing an organization is sufficiently broad
that it does not permit itself of a prescribed education and certification
requirement to ensure that managers are competent. In this respect, we agree
with commentators that have argued that business management is not a
traditional learned profession.172
However, business management, at least with respect to publicly traded
companies, would benefit greatly from a commitment to societal good and
an enforced code of ethics. In these respects, business management looks
very much like a learned profession. It is not reasonable to pretend that the
manager of a publicly traded company should be treated by society the same
as the manager of a private company. A large portion of society, either
directly or indirectly through retirement funds, have their financial wellbeing tied up in the stock of publicly traded companies.173 Large publicly
traded companies fulfill defense contracts, build infrastructure, and ensure
that the world’s day-to-day needs are met. Thus, managers of a publicly
traded company have an outsized influence on world affairs, the economy,
and society in general. In exchange for this outsized influence, it is
reasonable for members of society to expect business managers to have an
enforceable commitment to societal good and ethics, just as we do with
lawyers and doctors.

172. See Barker, supra note 146 (arguing there are notable differences between business
management and other learned and licensed professions).
173. See Changes in U.S. Family Finances from 2013 to 2016: Evidence from the Survey
of Consumer Finances, at 18, FED. RESERVE BULLETIN (Sept. 2017), https://www.federalres
erve.gov/publications/files/scf17.pdf [https://perma.cc/LTM8-FENF] (finding that 13.9% of
American households directly held stocks, 10.0% held pooled investment funds, and 52.1%
held retirement accounts, which will almost invariably be in some way invested in the stock
market).
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We argue that managers of publicly traded companies can best be
conceptualized as quasi-professionals. While management characteristics
do not map perfectly to the historic learned professions, there is sufficient
overlap that they can be regulated in a similar way. We believe that ethical
business management can best be enforced by society through requiring the
officers and directors of publicly traded companies to have an enforceable,
professional commitment to certain ethical standards and the societal good.
III. A MODEL FOR ETHICS ACCOUNTABILITY: THE U.S. OFFICE OF
GOVERNMENT ETHICS
As can be seen, the existing compliance mechanisms and selfregulation of ethical behavior by corporations and corporate officers is
falling short. Personal accountability of corporate officers is particularly
lacking. One need only note the near absence of personal accountability
following the ethical lapses leading to the 2008 sub-prime financial crisis.174
It is beyond the scope of this article to detail that crisis or all of its ethical
dimensions. Nonetheless, despite the sheer magnitude of the ethical lapses
that occurred leading up to the crisis, there were, ultimately, few personal
consequences for corporate officers.175 The reasons for this lack of personal
accountability are many and include those discussed above, as well as the
difficulty and reluctance to tackle the prosecution of white-collar business
crime.176
174. One study noted that no Wall Street executive went to jail following the 2008 crisis.
You Asked, We Answered: Why Didn’t Any Wall Street CEOs Go to Jail After the Financial
Crisis? It’s Complicated, MARKETPLACE, https://features.marketplace.org/why-no-ceo-wentjail-after-financial-crisis/ [https://perma.cc/H69K-AHZN] (last visited Oct. 5, 2019). In fact,
only eleven criminal referrals were made. Id. Instead, there were a few acquittals and very
large civil penalties. Id. This is in contrast to over 30,000 DOJ criminal referrals that were
made following the Savings and Loan Crisis of the 1980s. Id.
175. Id.
176. This is not a new problem. In 2002, James Comey, then a DOJ prosecutor (FBI
Director) was speaking to fellow prosecutors on the failure of DOJ prosecutors to undertake
their responsibility to prosecute corporate officials for wrongdoing, calling them
“chickenshit” because their focus had turned to only tackling cases they thought they could
readily win vice doing justice. Megan Harris, Comey Saw It Coming: Why No One Went to
Jail for the Housing Crash, (July 18, 2017), https://www.wesa.fm/post/comey-saw-it-coming
-why-no-one-went-jail-housing-crash#stream/0 [https://perma.cc/YCV6-5YKR]. The story
is related in an interview with an author who explains the transformation of DOJ from
vigorous prosecutors of white-collar crime to its current aversion to prosecuting corporate
executives. See id. (citing JESSE EISINGER, THE CHICKENSHIT CLUB: WHY THE JUSTICE
DEPARTMENT FAILS TO PROSECUTE EXECUTIVES (2017)). In the interview, Eisinger notes after
the savings and loans prosecutions, there was an effort through corporate lobbying to have the
DOJ roll back its prosecution policy and provide prosecutors less resources. As a result,

2020]

THE U.S. OFFICE OF CORPORATE ETHICS

955

Increasingly, rather than enforcement of individual accountability
through existing legal mechanisms, we are seeing the DOJ and other federal
agencies “settle” with corporations over ethical lapses through the payment
of fines.177 Indeed, the “winners” in such settlements are the corporations
themselves, who merely transmit payment to the government, as well as the
government itself who typically keeps all or large portions of the money for
itself.178 The “losers” in such settlements include the direct victims of
corporate wrongdoing in the case of tort liability, as they often receive
nothing for their injuries from the settlement.179 Moreover, while the
collection of such fines adds to the federal coffers, the payer of such fines
are not typically the corporate officials responsible for the unethical behavior
for which the corporation is settling, but rather, its stockholders and
customers.180
The U.S. taxpayer also loses with these settlement
arrangements since a large percentage of corporate settlements can be written
off as tax deductions.181
prosecutors turned to settling with corporations for money. Id.
177. Id. See, e.g., Walmart to pay $282 million to settle federal bribery charges, CBS
NEWS (June 20, 2019), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/walmart-to-pay-282-million-tosettle-federal-bribery-charges/ [https://perma.cc/QVD8-BL55]. The article notes Walmart’s
employees in this case were aware that payments to the intermediary were being recorded “as
payments to a construction company, even though there were numerous ‘red flags’ to indicate
that the intermediary was actually a government official.” Id. See also Press Release, SEC
Charges Marketing and Printing Services Provider with FCPA Violations, U.S. SEC. AND
EXCH. COMM’N (Sept. 26, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2019-193 [https://
perma.cc/Y3NC-TN49] (noting imposition of a nearly $10 million fine against
Quad/Graphics Inc. for bribery violations “[w]ithout admitting or denying the SEC’s
findings”).
178. For example, a recent $5 billion fine against Facebook for deceiving its users
regarding the handling of its user data, went to the U.S. Treasury. None went to the victims
of the misconduct. Ben Gilbert, Facebook Was Just Slapped With a Record-Setting $5 Billion
Fine For Mishandling User Data, But Those Users Won’t See a Penny. Here’s Where That
Money Goes, BUSINESS INSIDER (July 24, 2019), https://www.businessinsider.com/facebook5-billion-fine-where-does-it-go-2019-7 [https://perma.cc/HNC2-QK3D].
179. Id. Instead the civil penalty will go into the U.S. Treasury as provided by law. Id.;
see also Kristine Frazao, Billions in Federal Fines, Where Does It All Go?, SINCLAIR
BROADCASTING GROUP (Dec. 3, 2018), https://wjla.com/news/spotlight-on-america/billionsin-federal-fines-where-does-it-all-go-12-03-2018-190332284 [https://perma.cc/G5UC-5J4S]
(noting that of the $56 billion in fines collected by the Consumer Product Safety Commission
in a recent two year period, none went to victims).
180. See, e.g., Andrew Sorkin, Punishing Citi, or Its Shareholders?, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 2,
2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/03/business/03sorkin.html [https://perma.cc/F9G
Q-WTCD] (noting that a $75 million fine imposed against Citigroup for violating SEC rules
would be paid by its shareholders and cites former S.E.C. Chairman, Harvey Pitt, as stating
“[a] class of innocent shareholders is being asked to pay for the misconduct of corporate
officers.”).
181. In one public interest group study of the DOJ cases between 2012 and 2014 where
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This article proposes an entirely new mechanism of corporate ethics
enforcement; one that does not make it the responsibility of investors,
corporate customers, and taxpayers to pay for the lack of ethical behavior by
corporate officials, but rather a system of effective monitoring and
compliance by corporate officials of established ethical standards.
Individual accountability is needed.182
One such system that could serve as a model for ethics oversight of
individual corporate officers is the federal government’s system of ethics
oversight and compliance. An ethical commitment is required by employees
of the executive branch of the United States government involving many of
the same conflict of interest issues that corporate officers face.183 The Office
of Government Ethics imposes ethical requirements on these employees, in
spite of the fact that executive branch employees have various educational
backgrounds and skill sets. Likewise, we argue that an Office of Corporate
Ethics can be devised that imposes similar ethical requirements on the wide
variety of officers and directors of public companies.
A. Ethics Guidance and Compliance within the Executive Branch of
the Federal Government
The U.S. government’s ethics guidance and compliance system
pertaining to the executive branch is established by a combination of statutes,
regulations, and Executive Orders.184 The system is overseen by the U.S.
Office of Government Ethics (OGE), whose mission is to provide
settlement data is available, only 18.4% was explicitly non-deductible. See News Release:
Government Agencies Allow Corporations to Write Off Billions in Federal Settlement
Payments, U.S. PIRG (Dec. 3, 2015), https://uspirg.org/news/usf/government-agenciesallow-corporations-write-billions-federal-settlement-payments [https://perma.cc/YY4Z-UR
W5]. Additionally, of the $80 billion in corporate payments from the ten largest settlements
during the same time period, more than $48 billion could be written off. Id. A bill to amend
the IRS code to prevent corporate tax write-offs from settlements for corporate wrongdoing
was introduced in 2017 but does not appear to have gone anywhere. Government Settlement
Transparency and Reform Act, S. 803, 115th Cong. (2017); see also News Release,
Bipartisan Bill to Prevent Corporate Penalties from Becoming Tax Deductions, CHUCK
GRASSLEY (Apr. 3, 2017), https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/bipartisan-b
ill-prevent-corporate-penalties-becoming-tax-deductions
[https://perma.cc/PEM4-G92H]
(discussing the introduction of the Government Settlement Transparency and Reform Act to
the Senate).
182. See Sorkin, supra note 180. Pitt notes “the most effective way to deal with [unethical
behavior] is to impose the fines and penalties on the individuals . . . . They should feel the
sting of it.” Id.
183. See infra Section III(B).
184. Laws and Regulations, U.S. OFFICE OF GOV’T ETHICS, https://www.oge.gov/web/oge
.nsf/Laws+and+Regulations/ [https://perma.cc/ARR5-E2AF] (last visited Aug. 8, 2019).
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“leadership and oversight of the executive branch ethics program” in order
to “prevent and resolve conflicts of interest.”185 The OGE’s legal mandate
was created by the Ethics in Government Act (the “Act”).186 The Act
established the OGE as an executive agency.187 It also provides authority to
the Director of the OGE to develop and monitor compliance with the
requirements of the Act.188 The Act also contains detailed financial
disclosure requirements for federal personnel.189 The focus of the Act is the
maintenance of institutional integrity, and it charges the OGE with a number
of responsibilities, including criminal, civil, and administrative enforcement
of ethics, laws and regulations.190
The overall mission of OGE’s ethics program is to prevent conflicts of
interest or the appearance of conflicts of interest by members of the executive
branch that can result from “financial interests; business or personal
relationships; misuses of official position, official time, or public resources;
and the receipt of gifts.”191 The OGE has robust government ethics education
responsibilities to teach employees “how to identify government ethics
issues and obtain assistance in complying with government ethics laws and
regulations.”192
The OGE executes its mission through prevention, identification,
investigation, and enforcement of legal authorities established under the U.S.
government’s ethics framework.193 Investigations of potential violations are
185. Mission and Responsibilities, U.S. OFFICE OF GOV’T ETHICS, https://www.oge.gov/w
eb/oge.nsf/Mission%20and%20Responsibilities [https://perma.cc/B4R4-ZHU9] (last visited
Aug. 8, 2019). Conflict of interest is a “[t]erm used in connection with public officials and
fiduciaries and their relationship to matters of private interest or gain to them.” Conflict of
Interest, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990). It refers to “a clash between public
interest and private pecuniary interest of the individual concerned.” Id.
186. Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 101-505).
187. 5 U.S.C. app. § 401(a) (2020).
188. 5 U.S.C.A. app. § 402 (2020).
189. 5 U.S.C.A. app. §§ 101-111 (2020).
190. The responsibilities of the OGE are further detailed in 5 C.F.R. § 2638.108. See also
Mission and Responsibilities, supra note 185 (explaining that the OGE is responsible for
preventing and resolving conflicts of interest in the executive branch by advancing the
executive branch ethics program and monitoring compliance).
191. 5 C.F.R. § 2638.101(b) (2020); see also 5 C.F.R. § 2638.101(a) (2020) (noting the
primary mission of the executive branch ethics program is the prevention of conflicts of
interest). The program’s goals go beyond creating transparency towards ensuring integrity in
decision making and promoting public confidence by preventing conflicts of interest. 5
C.F.R. § 2638.101(c) (2020).
192. 5 C.F.R. § 2638.301 (2020). 5 C.F.R. Subpart C outlines the specific education
requirements to implement the general requirement from 5 C.F.R. § 2638.301.
193. See Mission and Responsibilities, supra note 185 (explaining that the OGE supervises
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primarily performed by various Inspectors General staff members across the
executive branch.194 The DOJ also has enforcement authority that includes
criminal and civil penalties.195
B. U.S. Government Ethics Compliance Legal Authorities
In addition to the Ethics in Government Act,196 all employees of the
executive branch are subject to a single set of principles of ethical conduct
created by Executive Order (EO) 12,731.197 The EO established fourteen
basic ethical principles applicable to all executive branch employees and
directed the OGE to establish a “single, comprehensive, and clear” set of
ethical conduct standards.198 Of the fourteen principles contained in the
executive order, at least ten are directly applicable to corporate officers
regarding their general duties. They are:
1. Requiring employees to place loyalty to the law and ethical

the executive branch ethics program, monitors agency compliance, and educates the public
about government integrity).
194. Government Ethics Responsibilities Of Inspectors General, 5 C.F.R § 2638.106
(2020). The Offices of Inspector General were established by the Inspector General Act of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-452, 92 Stat. 1101 (codified at 5 U.S.C. app. 3) [hereinafter “IG Act”].
The IG Act established Inspectors General (IGs) in twelve federal agencies. COUNCIL OF THE
INSPECTORS GEN. ON INTEGRITY AND EFFICIENCY, THE INSPECTORS GENERAL (July 14, 2014),
https://www.ignet.gov/sites/default/files/files/IG_Authorities_Paper_-_Final_6-11-14.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6HAU-37VM]. This number later expanded to seventy-two. Id. The
purpose of the IG Act is twofold: to ensure both integrity and efficiency in government
operations. Id. To this end, the IG Act authorizes IGs to audit and investigate, and to keep
the agency head and Congress informed. Id. For an example of an agency Inspector General
description, see About Us, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, https://www.oig.dhs.gov
/about [https://perma.cc/3ER5-85LH] (last visited Nov. 1, 2019).
195. See Enforcement, U.S. OFFICE OF GOV’T ETHICS, https://www.oge.gov/web/oge.nsf/e
nforcement [https://perma.cc/F8AB-7TWN] (last visited Aug. 30, 2019) (explaining that the
DOJ enforces statutes through criminal prosecution and the use of civil penalties); see also 5
C.F.R. § 2638.502 (2020) (providing that the director of the Office of Government Ethics will
notify the Inspector General or the Department of Justice of criminal law violations by an
employee).
196. Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521 § 1, 92 Stat. 1824, (codified
as amended at 5 U.S.C. app. § 101-505).
197. Exec. Order No. 12,674, 54 Fed. Reg. 15159 (Apr. 12, 1989) (as modified by Exec.
Order 12,731, 55 Fed. Reg. 42547 (Oct 17, 1990)). The ethical principles were later codified
in 5 C.F.R. § 2635.101(b) (2020). See also Employee Standards of Conduct, U.S. OFFICE OF
GOV’T ETHICS, https://www.oge.gov/Web/OGE.nsf/Employee+Standards+of+Conduct [https
://perma.cc/GSH4-43WS] (explaining that Executive Order 12,371 modified Executive Order
12,674, which provides fourteen principles of ethical conduct for executive branch
employees).
198. Exec. Order No. 12,731 §§ 201(a), 55 Fed. Reg. 42547 (Oct 17, 1990).

2020]

THE U.S. OFFICE OF CORPORATE ETHICS

959

principles above private gain.199
2. Prohibiting employees from holding financial interests that conflict
with their performance of duty.200
3. Prohibiting employees from engaging in financial transactions using
nonpublic information or allowing the improper use of such
information to further any private interests.201
4. Prohibiting employees, except as specifically allowed by other
regulation, from soliciting or accepting any gift or other item of
monetary value from any person or entity seeking official action
from, doing business with, or conducting activities regulated by the
employee’s organization.202
5. Requiring employees to put forth honest effort in the performance
of their duties.203
6. Prohibiting employees from using their position for private gain.204
7. Requiring employees to protect and conserve property and not use it
for other than authorized activities.205
8. Prohibiting employees from engaging in outside employment or
activities, including seeking or negotiating for employment, that
conflict with that officer’s official duties and responsibilities.206
9. Requiring employees to disclose waste, fraud, abuse, and corruption
to appropriate authorities.207
10. Requiring employees to endeavor to avoid any actions creating the
appearance that they are violating the law or ethical standards.208
These principles serve as the backdrop to more detailed ethics standards
that reinforce and implement the key ideas behind the principles.
C. Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive
Branch
In order to provide guidance to the executive branch agencies on
implementing the principles of ethical conduct outlined above, the OGE
published in August 1992, the Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

5 C.F.R. § 2635.101(b)(1) (2020).
Id. § 2635.101(b)(2).
Id. § 2635.101(b)(3).
Id. § 2635.101(b)(4).
Id. § 2635.101(b)(5).
Id. § 2635.101(b)(7).
Id. § 2635.101(b)(9).
Id. § 2635.101(b)(10).
Id. § 2635.10(b)(11).
Id. § 2635.101(b)(14).
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of the Executive Branch as codified in 5 C.F.R. Part 2635 (“OGE
Standards”).209 All employees of the executive branch are required to adhere
to the OGE Standards and “make ethical conduct the hallmark of government
service.”210 The OGE Standards are categorized into eight subparts.211 The
first subpart is a restatement of the fourteen principles of ethical conduct as
discussed above.212 The other subparts include rules on gifts from outside
sources, gifts between employees, conflicting financial interests, impartiality
in performing duties, outside employment, misuse of official position, and
rules regarding activities outside of employment.213 All of the ethical
conduct standards discussed below could be transferred and applied to
corporate officers.
1. Gifts from Outside Sources
Subpart B of OGE Standards generally prohibit employees from
soliciting or accepting gifts given to that employee as a result of that
employee’s official position or received from an otherwise “prohibited
source.”214 The definition of a gift is quite broad, comprising anything of
market value including a “gratuity, favor, discount, entertainment,
hospitality, loan, forbearance, or other item having monetary value.”215
The definition is purposefully inclusive because the exceptions to the
definitions of a gift are narrow. For example, the term “gift” does not include
modest items of food and non-alcoholic drinks, greeting cards, or
presentation items such as certificates or plaques.216 The definition also does
not include items generally available to the public such as loans from
financial institutions, discounts available to the public or a class of
209. 5 C.F.R. § 2635 (2017); see also Employee Standards of Conduct, U.S. OFFICE OF
GOV’T ETHICS, https://www.oge.gov/web/oge.nsf/Employee%20Standards%20of%20Condu
ct [https://perma.cc/3R9L-94FA] (last visited Aug. 30, 2019) (explaining that the OGE
published the Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch to replace
individual agency standards of conduct with a uniform standard).
210. 5 C.F.R. § 2638.102 (2017).
211. Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of The Executive Branch, 5 C.F.R. §
2635 (2017).
212. See supra Section III(B) (discussing the ethical principles of conduct that all
executive branch employees must follow).
213. Id.; see also Employee Standards of Conduct, U.S. OFFICE OF GOV’T ETHICS,
https://www.oge.gov/Web/OGE.nsf/Employee+Standards+of+Conduct [https://perma.cc/GS
H4-43WS] (providing summaries of each subpart of the OGE Standards).
214. 5 C.F.R. § 2635.202(a)–(b) (2020). See 5 C.F.R. § 2635.203(d) (defining “prohibited
source”).
215. 5 C.F.R. § 2635.203(b) (2020).
216. Id. § 2635.203(b)(1)–(2).
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employees, random prizes given in contests or events open to the public, or
free attendance at events for which the employee’s presence is required as
part of their official duties.217
The outside-source gift rule also contains modest exceptions for certain
types of items, which are otherwise defined as a gift. Some examples include
allowing an employee to accept a gift of $20 or less from one source on one
occasion—not to exceed $50 per calendar year,218 gifts given based on
personal relationships (family or personal friendships) and not given because
of the employee’s official position,219 awards of recognition,220 or gifts given
based on the employee’s outside business or employment relationships.221
2. Gifts Between Employees
Subpart C of the OGE Standards generally prohibit an employee from
giving a gift to an official superior of that employee, and prohibit employees
from accepting a gifts from other employees making less money than
themselves, unless otherwise excluded.222 The definition of a gift is the same
as defined in Subpart B.223
Exceptions include non-cash gifts of less than $10 per occasion, shared
food and beverages, personal hospitality at a residence, or gifts given to
celebrate a special, infrequent occasion, such as a marriage, birth or adoption
of a child, or the termination of a superior-subordinate relationship through
retirement, transfer, or resignation.224 Employees may also ask other
employees for voluntary contributions of nominal amounts to pool into a
group gift for such special, infrequent occasions.225
3. Conflicting Financial Interests
Subparts D-F of the OGE Standards pertain to avoiding conflicting
217. See generally id. § 2635.203(b)(3)-(8) (listing items that are excluded from the
definition of “gift”).
218. 5 C.F.R. § 2635.204(a) (2020).
219. Id. § 2635.204(b).
220. Id. § 2635.204(d).
221. Id. § 2635.204(e). There are a number of other gift exceptions such as attendance at
widely-attended gathering events, social invitations, meals and entertainment in foreign areas,
and gifts authorized by supplemental agency regulation or statute. 5 C.F.R. § 2635.204(g)(m) (2020). The level of detail within the rule is indicative of the seriousness placed on
outside gifts as a source of potential ethical problems.
222. General Standards, 5 C.F.R. § 2635.302.
223. Definitions, 5 C.F.R. § 2635.203(b).
224. Exceptions, 5 C.F.R. § 2635.304(a).
225. Id. § 2635.304(c).
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financial interests in a variety of circumstances. These include disqualifying
employees from certain duties that would create financial conflicts,
prohibiting financial interests that create conflicts, avoiding financial
interests that could contribute to the appearance of a conflict as viewed by a
reasonable outside person, and rules on seeking contemporaneous or future
employment that might create conflicts with the employee’s present agency.
a. Disqualifying and Prohibited Financial Interests
Subpart D of the OGE Standards contains two related provisions
designed to avoid conflicting financial interests. The first provision pertains
to disqualification of an employee from participating in government matters,
the outcome of which would have a “direct and predictable” interest on that
employee’s financial interests.226 The accompanying rules related to this
provision are designed to prevent employees from violating the prohibitions
of 18 U.S.C. § 208(a), which prohibit executive agency employees from
performing certain official acts that affect their personal financial interest.227
The second provision is the prohibition on holding or acquiring
particular financial interests that an executive agency deems would create a
conflict of interest.228 Each agency has the discretion to define such
prohibitions by agency regulation, along with its determination that an
employee holding such interests would result in a substantial conflict of
interest with that employee’s duties or the agency’s mission.229 Under these
rules, the financial interests of certain other persons are imputed to the
employee as if they were the employee’s own. These include the financial
interests of an employee’s spouse, minor child, general partner, an additional
employer of the same employee, or a potential future employer of the
employee currently being negotiated.230
b. Avoidance of the Appearances of Financial Conflicts of
Interest
Subpart E of the OGE Standards are related to the Subpart D

226. Overview, 5 C.F.R. § 2635.401.
227. See Disqualifying Financial Interests, 5 C.F.R. § 2635.402 (citing Acts Affecting a
Personal Financial Interest, 18 U.S.C. § 208(a)). Among the exemptions from this
requirement are those acts exempted by OGE regulation as being “too remote or
inconsequential to affect the integrity of the services” of the employee. 18 U.S.C. § 208(b)(2).
228. Prohibited Financial Interests, 5 C.F.R. § 2635.403.
229. 5 C.F.R. § 2635.403(b).
230. 5 C.F.R. § 2635.402(b)(2).
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requirements. The rules require impartiality when performing official acts
as an employee in general and prohibit an employee from participating in
certain matters that would affect the financial interests of members of that
employee’s household (and certain other persons) if a reasonable person with
knowledge of the facts would question that employee’s impartiality.231 In
essence, these rules are designed so an employee avoids even the appearance
of impartiality in the performance of their duties.232
c. Seeking Other Employment
Rules on seeking outside employment are contained in Subpart F of the
OGE Standards. Among these, are rules that prohibit an employee from
participating personally and substantially in matters that could affect the
financial interests of a future employer—also a violation of 18 U.S.C. §
208(a).233 The rules also require employees who are required to file annual
financial disclosures to notify the U.S. government within three days of their
beginning of any negotiation for other employment, and to seek recusal in
writing from involvement in any government matter that would create a
conflict of interest, or the appearance of a conflict of interest.234
4. Misuse of Position
The last significant section of the OGE Standards that could be made
directly transferable to corporate officers would be Subpart G, which
contains provisions regarding the misuse of the employee’s official
position.235 These include using the office of the employee for their own
private gain, or the gain of friends and relatives,236 engaging in personal
financial transactions using nonpublic information,237 creating an affirmative
duty of the employee to protect government property and to use it only for
official purposes,238 and prohibiting the use of official work time for any
endeavor other than an honest effort to perform the employee’s official
duties or responsibilities.239

231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

Impartiality in Performing Official Duties, 5 C.F.R. § 2635.501(a).
Id.
Acts Affecting a Personal Financial Interest, 18 U.S.C. § 208(a).
Seeking Other Employment, 5 C.F.R. § 2635.601.
Misuse of Position, 5 C.F.R. § 2635.701(a).
Use of Public Office for Private Gain, 5 C.F.R. § 2635.702.
Use of Nonpublic Information, 5 C.F.R. § 2635.703.
Use of Government Property, 5 C.F.R. § 2635.704.
Use of Official Time, 5 C.F.R. § 2635.705.
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D. OGE’s Ethics Enforcement System
As previously noted, ethics requirements are monitored by designated
ethics officials within the executive branch agencies.240 Each agency
appoints a Designated Agency Ethics Official (“DAEO”).241 Among the
responsibilities of the DAEO are the execution of the agency’s employee
financial disclosure program,242 and the appointment of “deputy ethics
officials” from the agency who assist in carrying out the functions of the
agency’s ethics program.243
Once ethics officials become aware of possible violations of criminal
or civil statutes, or of a violation of the OGE Standards by an employee of
the agency, the evidence may be referred to the appropriate office or agency
for review and possible action.244 Suspected violations of criminal or civil
statutes are referred to the DOJ.245 A violation of the OGE Standards may
be referred for investigation and possible disciplinary action against the
employee by the employee’s relevant agency.246
The OGE Standards encourage employees to seek ethics advice from
designated ethics agency officials and prohibit an agency from taking
disciplinary action against an employee who does, provided the employee
disclosed all the relevant circumstances to the ethics officials and relied on
the advice of the ethics official in good faith.247
1. OGE Standards of Conduct Subject to Criminal Sanction
Violation of the OGE Standards are subject to a number of criminal

240. See infra Section III(A) and accompanying notes. See also Definitions, 5 C.F.R. §
2635.102(c) (describing that designated agency ethics officials have been delegated authority
to assist in carrying out their responsibilities).
241. Appointment of a Designated Agency Ethics Officials, 5 C.F.R. § 2638.104(a).
242. Responsibilities of the Designated Agency Ethics Official, 5 C.F.R. § 2638.104(c)(8).
243. Program Support by Additional Ethics Officials and Other Individuals, 5 C.F.R. §
2638.104(e).
244. Violations of Criminal Provisions Related To Government Ethics, 5 C.F.R. §
2638.502; see also Enforcement, U.S. OFFICE OF GOV’T ETHICS, https://www.oge.gov/web/og
e.nsf/enforcement [https://perma.cc/F8AB-7TWN] (last visited Aug. 30, 2019) (“When ethics
officials find evidence that an employee has violated an ethics criminal statute or regulation,
they must refer that evidence to the appropriate authority for action.”).
245. Enforcement, supra note 244.
246. Disciplinary and Corrective Action, 5 C.F.R. § 2635.106; see also 5 C.F.R. §
2638.504 (outlining investigative and hearing procedures involving employees suspected of
violating noncriminal OGE Standards).
247. Ethics Advice, 5 C.F.R. § 2635.107.
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statutes. Among these is the bribery and illegal gratuities statute248 and a
series of statutes referred to as the “criminal conflict of interest statutes.”249
This set of statutes is tailored for government employees, and though a few
might be less adaptable to application to corporate officers,250 others could
be modified as needed.251
Additionally, there are numerous other criminal and noncriminal
statutes related to OGE Standards.252 Of the criminal prohibitions, a
sampling includes fraud or false statements with regard to government
matters,253 concealing or destroying public records,254 failing to account for
public money,255 or prohibiting the disclosure of proprietary or certain
confidential information.256 These statutes might also be made applicable to
corporate officers.
2. Sanctions for Violation of OGE Noncriminal Standards
a. Civil Penalties
Violations of OGE Standards not subject to criminal sanction are
subject to civil, disciplinary, or corrective actions.257 As an example, senior
level executive branch employees who violate certain prohibitions on outside
earned income and employment are subject to civil penalties.258 Civil penalty
rules include prohibiting senior employees from receiving more than fifteen
percent of their annual government salary from outside earned income,259
receiving compensation for practicing or performing outside professional
248. 18 U.S.C. § 201.
249. These are 18 U.S.C. §§ 202–209. Statutes, U.S. OFFICE. OF GOV’T ETHICS, https://ww
w.oge.gov/web/oge.nsf/Statutes [https://perma.cc/DU22-4MU9] (last visited Sept. 9, 2019).
250. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 207 (containing restrictions on activities of certain individuals
after they leave government service); 18 U.S.C. § 205 (prohibiting compensation for
representational activities in which the U.S. is a party).
251. For example, 18 U.S.C. § 205 prohibits executive branch employees from
participating “personally and substantially” in a particular government matter that would
affect their personal financial interests. This statute could be modified to corporate officers
participating in corporate matters that would affect the corporate officers’ personal financial
interests.
252. A list of these is contained in 5 C.F.R. § 2635.902.
253. 18 U.S.C. § 1001.
254. 18 U.S.C. § 2071.
255. 18 U.S.C. § 643.
256. 18 U.S.C. § 1905.
257. Civil, Disciplinary and Other Action, 5 C.F.R. § 2636.104.
258. Civil, Disciplinary and Other Action, 5 C.F.R. § 2636.104(a).
259. See The 15 Percent Limitation on Outside Earned Income, 5 C.F.R. § 2636.304(a)
(implementing 5 U.S.C. app. § 501(a)(2)).
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duties that involve a fiduciary relationship,260 or receiving any compensation
for serving as an officer or member of an outside board, corporation, of other
entity.261 In case of such violation, the employee is subject to civil penalties
of up to $10 thousand or the amount of the outside compensation earned,
whichever is greater.262
b. Corrective Actions
Violations of OGE Standards are also subject to corrective action,
which is defined as “any action necessary to remedy a past violation or
prevent a continuing violation” of the OGE Standards.263 Remedies include
changing the employee’s assignment, ordering the employee to divest
conflicting assets, terminating the offending activity, and/or counseling.264 It
may also include restitution by the employee.265 Corrective action responses
may be fairly characterized as non-punitive in nature and intended to prevent
the violation from occurring in the future. Although it is the responsibility
of the employee’s agency to initiate disciplinary or corrective action,
corrective action may be ordered by the OGE under its own authority.266
Procedurally, the OGE, after becoming aware of a non-criminal
violation of OGE standards by an executive branch employee, may consult
with the agency and the employee as necessary to ensure compliance with
the OGE Standards at issue.267 This may include recommending that the
agency investigate the matter and consider taking disciplinary or corrective
action against their employee.268 If the agency does not then undertake the
recommendation within a reasonable time, the OGE reports the matter to the
President269 and may initiate investigative proceedings on its own.270
260. Compensation and Other Restrictions Relating to Professions Involving A Fiduciary
Relationship, 5 C.F.R. § 2636.305(a) (implementing 5 U.S.C. app. § 502(a)(1) and (a)(3)).
261. See Compensation Restriction Applicable to Service as an Officer or Member of a
Board, 5 C.F.R. § 2636.306(a) (implementing 5 U.S.C. app. § 502(a)(4)).
262. Civil Penalties, 5 U.S.C. app. § 504.
263. See 5 CFR § 2635.102(e) (defining “corrective action”).
264. Id.
265. Civil, Disciplinary and Other Action, 5 C.F.R. § 2636.104(b).
266. 5 C.F.R. § 2636.104(b); see also Disciplinary and Corrective Action, 5 C.F.R. §
2635.106(b) (stating that the Director of the OGE may order corrective action).
267. Recommendations and Advice to Employees and Agencies, 5 C.F.R. § 2638.503.
268. Id.
269. Violations of Noncriminal Provisions Related to Government Ethics, 5 C.F.R. §
2635.504(a).
270. 5 C.F.R. § 2635.504(b). The OGE notifies the employee that it is considering an
order for the employee to take specific action to terminate an ongoing violation of the OGE
standard. The employee is then provided a reasonable opportunity to respond before a final

2020]

THE U.S. OFFICE OF CORPORATE ETHICS

967

c. Disciplinary Actions
Disciplinary actions are agency actions taken against executive branch
employees that include reprimands, suspensions, demotions, and removal
(termination).271 Within this range of actions are “lesser disciplinary actions”
that include warnings, counseling, and job suspensions of fourteen days or
less, and “more severe adverse actions,” which are suspensions of more than
fourteen days, reductions in pay, demotions, and termination (i.e.,
removals).272
The requirements and procedures pertaining to the more severe adverse
actions of suspension, reduction in pay, demotion, and removal are statutory,
with the statutory language providing agency requirements and due process
procedures for the employees.273 These actions are taken to “promote the
efficiency of the service.”274
In sum, the U.S. government has ample legal tools and resources to
monitor the ethical behavior of individual executive branch employees,
correct ethical mistakes and lapses, and enforce ethical responsibilities
through corrective actions and disciplinary measures. Enforcing individual
responsibility for proper ethical conduct is vital for the system to function.275
decision or order occurs. 5 C.F.R. § 2638.504 (outlining investigative and hearing procedures
involving employees suspected of violating noncriminal OGE Standards).
271. See Definitions, 5 C.F.R. § 2635.102(g) (2019) (describing possible disciplinary
actions).
272. See Managing Federal Employees’ Performance Issues Or Misconduct, U.S. OFFICE
OF PERSONNEL MGMT., at 11, https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/employee-relation
s/reference-materials/managing-federal-employees%E2%80%99-performance-issues-or-mis
conduct.pdf [https://perma.cc/VH2R-W3PW] (last visited Sept. 21, 2019) (addressing the
management of federal employees’ performance issues or misconduct). An agency may also
define disciplinary actions as “informal,” such as oral admonishments or written warnings or
counselings, and “formal,” such as letters of reprimand, suspensions, and removals.
Administrative Instruction 8 § 3.1, at 7, U.S DEP’T OF DEF. (Dec. 16, 2016), https://fas.org/irp/
doddir/dod/ai-8.pdf [https://perma.cc/JR72-BTT8] (last visited Sept. 19, 2019).
273. See 5 U.S.C., Chapter 75 (describing adverse actions).
274. 5 U.S.C. § 7503(a) (2019); 5 U.S.C. § 7513(a) (2012). The action must be taken “for
such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service.” The statutory procedures vary
slightly depending on whether the proposed disciplinary action is a suspension for 14 days or
less. In such cases, among other options, the employee is entitled to 14 days advance written
notice and a reasonable time to respond orally or in writing. 5 U.S.C. § 7503(b) (2012). For
longer suspensions, demotions, reductions in pay, and removal actions, employees are entitled
to 30-days advance notice and a reasonable time to respond of not less than seven days. 5
U.S.C. § 7513(b) (2012).
275. See Adam Welinsky, Individual and Moral Responsibility In Criminal Law, 77
CORNELL L. REV. 1067, 1067 (1992) (arguing that individual responsibility does not just apply
to what is commonly thought of as criminal law, rather it is individual responsibility to a
“fundamental social code” to refrain from malign action). Avoiding ethical misbehaviors
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A similar monitoring and enforcement system is sadly lacking with regard
to corporate officer ethics accountability.
E. Structure of the Office of Government Ethics
The OGE is a small executive branch agency of approximately seventyfive employees.276 Created by the Ethics in Government Act,277 the OGE is
led by a Senate-confirmed Director for a five-year term.278 It has an annual
budget of approximately $17 million.279 The primary purpose of the OGE
and the executive branch ethics program is prevention.280 The OGE has four
major divisions and eight subdivisions.281
For example, the OGE’s Program Counsel Division conducts outreach
to the OGE’s stakeholders and the public and supports and trains executive
branch agency ethics officials.282 The Agency Assistance Branch provides
direct advice to agency ethics officials in response to ethics questions or
emerging ethics issues such officials may have.283 The Ethics Law and
Policy Branch develops and issues ethics regulations and authorizes
executive agencies to supplement those regulations with additional ethics
guidance specific to them.284 It also publishes legal advisories, assists
stakeholders in resolving complex ethics issues, and supports enforcement
authorities, such as the DOJ and agency Inspectors General with consistent
application of ethics laws and regulations.285 The Compliance Division has
two branches: the Program Review Branch and the Financial Disclosure
Branch.286 The Program Review Branch reviews agency ethics programs,
would certainly fall within this paradigm.
276. See U.S. OFFICE OF GOV’T ETHICS, AGENCY PROFILE: PREVENTING CONFLICTS OF
INTEREST, at 8, https://www.oge.gov/web/oge.nsf/0/3B02C6409E90E0C185258082005E6D
8E/$FILE/OGE%20Agency%20Profile%20Book%20Single%20Page%20View.pdf [https://
perma.cc/K7YC-WL8H] (last visited Oct. 26, 2019) (stating that the number of employees is
around seventy-five); see also Mission and Responsibilities, supra note 185 (describing the
mission and responsibilities of the agency).
277. Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-52, 92 Stat. 1824 (1978) (codified
as amended at 5 U.S.C. App. §§101–505).
278. AGENCY PROFILE, supra note 276, at 9.
279. Mission and Responsibilities, supra note 185.
280. AGENCY PROFILE, supra note 276, at 6.
281. AGENCY PROFILE, supra note 276, at 18.
282. AGENCY PROFILE, supra note 276, at 15 (listing the responsibilities of the OGE’s
Program Counsel).
283. AGENCY PROFILE, supra note 276, at 15.
284. See AGENCY PROFILE, supra note 276, at 16 (describing the duties of the Ethics Law
and Policy Branch).
285. AGENCY PROFILE, supra note 276, at 16.
286. AGENCY PROFILE, supra note 276, at 17.
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tracks individual compliance with ethics agreements, and provides criminal
referrals to the DOJ.287 Lastly, the Financial Disclosure Branch monitors
conflicts of interest through its management of the financial disclosure
requirements for certain executive branch employees.288 As noted below,
several of these divisions could be adapted for use within a U.S. Office of
Corporate Ethics.289
1. Agency Ethics Officials
There are currently about five thousand agency ethics officials who
work at the various executive branch agencies.290 Each executive branch
head designates a Designated Agency Ethics Official (“DAEO”) for that
particular executive branch.291 The DAEO then designates additional
professional ethics officials (“ethics officers”) to assist as needed.292 The
DAEO ensures that ethics officers have the training and skills necessary to
perform their assigned duties and carry out the functions of the agency’s
ethics program.293 Each agency DAEO, along with assisting ethics officers,
have a number of key responsibilities. Among them are to liaise with the
OGE; provide advice and counsel to prospective, current, and former agency
employees regarding government ethics laws and regulations (collectively,
“ethics rules”); carry out the agency’s financial disclosure program; assist
the agency with enforcement of ethics rules through disciplinary or
corrective action and other means, as well as appropriate referrals to the
DOJ; provide the IGs with advice on ethics rules; and provide ethics training
to designated agency leaders.294
2. The Inspectors General
As noted previously, investigations of potential ethics violations within
executive agencies are primarily performed by various Inspectors General
staff members across the executive branch.295 In accordance with the IG Act,
287. AGENCY PROFILE, supra note 276, at 17.
288. AGENCY PROFILE, supra note 276, at 17.
289. See infra Section IV(A)(2).
290. See Mission and Responsibilities, supra note 185 (stating that there are nearly five
thousand ethics officials).
291. Government Ethics Responsibilities of Agency Ethics Officials, 5 C.F.R. §
2638.104(a) (2019).
292. 5 C.F.R. § 2638.104(e) (2019).
293. Id.
294. 5 C.F.R.§ 2638.104(c) (2019).
295. See supra, note 194 and accompanying text.
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IGs have wide-ranging authority to audit and investigate.296 Agency IGs are
appointed by the President without regard to political affiliation.297 The
President may not remove or transfer an IG without notifying Congress in
writing at least thirty days prior.298 To maintain independence, IGs report to
and are supervised directly by the heads of the agency involved299 and are
required to have direct and timely access to the agency head when necessary
to perform IG functions.300 IGs are also required to keep both Congress and
the relevant agency head fully informed about agency deficiencies.301
Although the IG’s mandate is broad,302 with regard specifically to ethics
matters, the IG investigates “suspected violations of conflict of interest laws
and other government ethics laws and regulations,” supports OGE requests
for ethics investigations, and keeps OGE informed of IG referrals of ethics
violations to the DOJ.303 Thus, the IGs, OGE, DAEOs and their respective
supporting staffs operate together for ethics violation prevention,
investigation, and enforcement as pictured below.

304

While there are inherent differences between government service and
serving as an officer or director of a publicly traded company, there are
similarities in the standards of ethics applicable to each. In each situation,
296. IG Act § 4(a). For a concise discussion of IG authorities and responsibilities, see THE
INSPECTORS GENERAL, COUNCIL OF THE INSPECTORS GENERAL ON INTEGRITY AND EFFICIENCY
(July 14, 2014), https://www.ignet.gov/sites/default/files/files/IG_Authorities_Paper_-_Final
_6-11-14.pdf [https://perma.cc/6HAU-37VM].
297. IG Act § 3(a).
298. IG Act § 3(b).
299. IG Act § 3(a).
300. IG Act § 6(a)(6).
301. IG Act § 4(a)(5).
302. The IG Act’s purposes also include audits, investigations, and recommendations
regarding the effectiveness and efficiency of government programs. IG Act § 2.
303. Government Ethics Responsibilities of Inspectors General, 5 C.F.R. § 2638.106
(2019).
304. AGENCY PROFILE, supra note 277, at 7.
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individuals are expected to put the interest of the organization over their own
and to comport with standards of conduct applicable to one in a position of
trust. Indeed, this is the theoretical basis of fiduciary standards in state
corporate law, though these standards simply are not enforced.305 We argue
that with some modification, to take into account the differences between
publicly held corporations and the government, a U.S. Office of Corporate
Ethics modeled on these OGE standards would give much needed individual
accountability in the area of corporate management.
IV. THE U.S. OFFICE OF CORPORATE ETHICS
“Ethics without regulation won’t cut it.”306 That conclusion, conveyed
over a decade ago by one commentator is clearly an idea whose time has
come.307 What is not needed are more “ethical codes and self-regulation, but
schemes of tighter regulation, greater oversight, and dire consequences for
those who breach them.”308 Simply put, lack of ethical behavior by corporate
officers must have individual consequences in order for significant change
in corporate behavior overall to improve.
In our view, a much more effective way to monitor and ensure ethical
compliance by corporations than the current patchwork of tools and practices
would be through creation of a U.S. Office of Corporate Ethics (“OCE”)
modeled after the U.S. Office of Government Ethics. The focus of the OCE
would be on individual ethics training, monitoring, and compliance. As will
be discussed below, much of the OGE’s structure, as well as its ethics
monitoring, compliance, and enforcement systems could effectively be
adapted for ethics oversight of corporations and corporate officers in the
OCE.
Naturally, any suggestion of the creation of a U.S. government agency
will be met with resistance and, without doubt, the legislative foundations,
cost, and complexity of creating agency structures and enabling them to
function are significant.309 Nonetheless, given the current state of ongoing
305. See discussion supra Section I(B) (discussing shareholder derivative litigation and
the unenforced fiduciary standard in corporate law).
306. James Saft, Ethics without regulation won’t cut it, REUTERS (Jan. 30, 2009), http://bl
ogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2009/01/30/ethics-without-regulation-will-not-cut-it/ [https://p
erma.cc/SW2U-6H9V].
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. See, e.g., Kurt Schacht, The SEC’s Budget Shows Just How Outgunned it is, THE HILL
(Apr. 13, 2019, 2:00:00 PM), https://thehill.com/opinion/finance/438651-the-secs-budgetshows-just-how-outgunned-it-is [https://perma.cc/F7M9-WNHA] (writing that Mr. Schacht,
the managing director of the advocacy division of the CFA Institute, notes that the SEC’s
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ethical lapses by corporations and the tremendous effect such lapses are
having not only on the corporation and its stakeholders, but the public as
well, the authors view the creation of an OCE as a viable, effective tool. It
is one that would result in more ethics oversight of corporate decisionmaking and establish effective ethics training of corporate officials.
Importantly, it would provide more effective compliance and disciplinary
tools for holding corporate officers personally accountable.
The purpose of this section of the paper is not to prescribe in detail what
our proposed OCE should look like, including such issues as its detailed
structure or authority, nor to provide a comprehensive outline of the specific
ethics rules that should be applicable to corporate officers. To do so would
be presumptive and undermine the careful political process that would need
to occur to effectuate the ideas in this section. Rather, in proposing an OCE,
we seek to introduce concepts for consideration and offer some ideas for
modeling of an OCE after the OGE such that it could be created more
quickly.
A. Proposed Structure and Function of the Office of Corporate Ethics
1. Leadership Structure
Professor Steven Ramirez has previously argued for the creation of a
“Federal Reserve of Corporate Governance” to set corporate governance
standards for publicly traded companies.310 His recommendation provides
an excellent basic structure for the OCE we recommend, which would
provide many of the same benefits as his proposed corporate governance
agency. The Federal Reserve (“Fed”) was structured in a particular way to
attempt to shield it from both political and special interests.311 Key structural
aspects that help give the Fed independence to carry out its mission are
lengthy terms of office only subject to removal for cause, staggered terms so
no one President will have outsized control, post-employment job
restrictions, competitive salaries, and self-funding to insulate the Fed from
the political appropriations process.312

budget request for FY 2020 was $1.746 billion, which he argues is inadequate to provide
proper supervision of the United States’ large capital markets).
310. Steven A. Ramirez, The End of Corporate Governance Law: Optimizing Regulatory
Structures for a Race to the Top, 24 YALE J. ON REG. 313, 350–51 (2007).
311. Id. at 350 (noting that the Fed structure “was created so that the Fed could exercise
its prodigious power over monetary policy in accordance ‘with the general public interest’
and not ‘the majority of special interests’”) (internal citations omitted).
312. Id.
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The goal of this legal structure is to de-politicize monetary policy by
making it difficult for politicians to affect the Fed’s decision-making on a
day-to-day basis.313 While this can lead to arguments that this makes the
Fed’s power unchecked, there is still restraint placed on the Fed by the fact
that Congress could statutorily modify its structure or even abolish it
altogether.314 Depoliticized monetary policy has become the standard in
modern industrialized economies and so far has operated relatively well, or
at least better than any alternative that has been devised.315
We argue that issues of corporate governance and ethics, like monetary
policy, need to be managed in a de-politicized manner, and thus a structure
similar to that of the Fed or other independent agencies is needed. Many
corporate leaders wield significant power due to the wealth that they
command, and this power gives them the ability to curry favor with
politicians. Because the OCE we propose would be involved in setting
standards and policing the ethical conduct of these high-level officials,
independence is important to this job being done well. This principle is well
recognized in our current regulatory structure, as most of our federal
agencies and commissions that regulate the economy are given some
measure of independence.316
The ideal OCE would be similarly structured, with an odd number of
commissioners with staggered terms, from different political parties,
restricted in their financial holdings and outside employment, and subject to
removal only for cause. As with other administrative agencies, the OCE
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Id. at 351 (noting “[d]epoliticized monetary policy has stood the test of time:
Financial markets essentially demand it, and politicians acquiesce to it”); see also Eric S.
Rosengren, Central Bank Independence: What it Is, What it Isn’t – and the Importance of
Accountability, FED. RESERVE BANK OF BOSTON (July 19, 2019), https://www.bostonfed.org/
news-and-events/speeches/2019/central-bank-independence.aspx [https://perma.cc/BCZ6-M
PEK] (last visited Jan. 1, 2020) (noting that studies have found “that countries with more
independent central banks, such as the U.S., have lower inflation rates than those with less
independent central banks”).
316. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (2019) (establishing the Securities and Exchange
Commission with five Commissioners that serve five-year staggered terms, with no more than
three Commissioners belonging to the same party); see also, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 41 (2019)
(establishing the Federal Trade Commission, and requiring that it be composed of five
Commissioners, with no more than three being members of the same political party, serving
staggered terms, subject to various outside employment and financial interest requirements,
and only able to be removed by the President for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance
in office”); see also, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 154 (a)–(c) (2019) (establishing the Federal
Communications Commission, and requiring that it be composed of five Commissioners, with
no more than three being members of the same political party, and subject to various outside
employment and financial interest requirements).
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should have rulemaking authority to pass rules and regulations to carry out
its statutory mandate.317
2. Funding
An important issue for the formation of an OCE is funding. Should the
agency be self-funded or subject to the congressional appropriations
process? We argue that optimally, the OCE should be a self-funded agency
and be required to fund its operations through the collection of fees and fines.
While determining the exact method and amount of funding necessary for
such an agency is outside the scope of this article, the concept of self-funding
of administrative agencies in whole or in part, particularly of agencies that
regulate economic and financial matters, is not unprecedented.318
Commentators have argued that self-funding is an important aspect of
making an agency independent.319 Indeed, after the most recent financial
crisis, there was a push by the SEC chairman and others for the SEC to be
self-funded, so it could better regulate financial markets, but ultimately selffunding was not approved as a part of Dodd-Frank.320 Since that time,
commentators have asserted that the SEC has continued to be underfunded
given the scope of financial market issues it has to regulate.321
317. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 154(i) (2019) (“The Commission may perform any and all acts,
make such rules and regulations, and issue such orders, not inconsistent with this chapter, as
may be necessary in the execution of its functions.”).
318. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 159(a)(1) (2019) (giving the Federal Communications
Commission the authority to collect regulatory fees to help cover its operating costs); see also,
e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 5497 (a) (2019) (providing for the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau to
be self-funded through a transfer of funds from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, which is also self-funded, primarily through interest on government securities).
319. See Lisa Schultz Bressman & Robert B. Thompson, The Future of Agency
Independence, 63 VAND. L. REV. 599, 611 (2010) (writing that “[s]everal of the financial
independent agencies have funding sources, usually from uses and industry, which frees them
from dependence on congressional appropriations and annual budgets developed by the
executive branch”); see also Steven A. Ramirez, Depoliticizing Financial Regulation, 41 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 503, 589 (2000) (“Funding is key to independence.”).
320. See Ronald D. Orol, Five SEC Chairmen and Schumer Push for Self-Funded SEC,
MARKETWATCH (Apr. 15, 2010, 3:50:00 PM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/five-secchairs-and-schumer-want-self-funded-sec-2010-04-15
[https://perma.cc/3R7F-YL9U]
(noting that the current SEC chairman and several past chairmen argued that the SEC needed
to be self-funded to keep up with the regulation of financial markets); see also Bruce Carton,
Same Old, Same Old with SEC Budget Process, COMPLIANCE WEEK (June 19, 2015, 7:45:00
AM), https://www.complianceweek.com/same-old-same-old-with-sec-budget-process/12123
.article [https://perma.cc/Y7ER-MMWM] (noting that self-funding was not approved as a part
of Dodd-Frank, and the SEC continues to be underfunded as a part of the Congressional
budget process).
321. Carton, supra note 320. See also Kurt Schacht, The SEC’s Budget Shows Just How
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We believe that self-funding could have numerous potential benefits for
the OCE. First, as previously indicated, it would insulate the OCE from the
politics of the budgeting process, noted as an important aspect of
independence. Second, it would encourage it to operate in an efficient
manner while still giving it the opportunity to generate adequate funds to
carry out is mission. Just like the corporations that it oversees, it would have
to carefully monitor its own income and expenditures. However, it could
adjust fees to increase its budget if necessary.
Third, in line with our argument of treating business managers as quasiprofessionals, we contend that such a structure could give the individuals
governed by the OCE more of a feeling of pride and ownership in the OCE
and likewise aid the OCE in connecting with the group it regulates.322 The
SEC is closely integrated with the private sector that it regulates through the
utilization of “self-regulatory organizations” like the stock exchanges and
the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority.323 These organizations are
private and serve a quasi-regulatory function with oversight from the SEC.324
While there are certainly potential hazards with such a structure, such as
conflicts of interest and regulatory capture, there are benefits as well.325
Professional associations operate in a similar independent manner. For
example, the Texas Bar Association is a government agency authorized by
statute.326 It is overseen by the Supreme Court of Texas.327 However, its
day-to-day affairs are largely run by the members of the state bar itself
through officers and the board of directors, which are elected by the members
of the state bar.328 Although it is a government agency, it is does not receive
state tax dollars and is not part of the budget appropriations process.329 This
Outgunned it is, THE HILL (Apr. 13, 2019, 2:00:00 PM), https://thehill.com/opinion/finance/
438651-the-secs-budget-shows-just-how-outgunned-it-is [https://perma.cc/F7M9-WNHA]
(arguing that the SEC’s budget is inadequate to provide proper supervision of the United
States’ large capital markets).
322. See Bressman & Thompson, supra note 319, at 614 (noting how the SEC’s utilization
of self-regulatory organizations (“SROs”) helps it stay in touch with the securities markets
and craft effective policy).
323. Bressman & Thompson, supra note 319, at 614.
324. Bressman & Thompson, supra note 319, at 614.
325. See Bressman & Thompson, supra note 319, at 615 (noting the benefits of SROs,
including practical information, self-discipline of the regulated parties, and the potential for
voluntary compliance through the industry policing its own).
326. TEX. GOV’T. CODE ANN. § 81.011(a) (West 2019) (“The state bar is a public
corporation and an administrative agency of the judicial department of government.”).
327. Id. § 81.011(c) (“The Supreme Court of Texas, on behalf of the judicial department,
shall exercise administrative control over the state bar under this chapter.”).
328. Id. §§ 81.019-020 (establishing officers of the state bar and the board of directors of
the state bar).
329. Frequently Asked Questions, STATE BAR OF TEX., https://www.texasbar.com/Conten
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gives the members of the state bar a distinct feeling of ownership, pride, and
self-regulation of their own profession, even though the ultimate authority is
the government. We would not argue that the OCE should have the same
degree of self-determination as a state bar, as we have admitted there are
important differences between the learned professions and business
managers.330 However, we do believe that the OCE would function
optimally if officers and directors embraced it as a quasi-professional
organization that they are proud to be a part of and sets them apart as being
willing to be held to a high standard of ethics due to the power and prestige
of their positions as corporate managers. To at least some degree, selffunding through fees and assessments and a degree of independence from
the political branches of government could help accomplish this. While the
hazard of inadequate regulation can always manifest with independence, the
ultimate oversight of congressional removal or modification of the enabling
legislation would also always be present.
3. Administrative Structure
Administratively, the OCE could be structured similarly to the OGE in
certain key respects. It need only have a relatively modest number of
employees to administer the OCE’s overall mission.331 The OGE’s
divisional structure could be readily adapted to the OCE since its functions
would substantially overlap.332 Instead of agency ethics officials scattered
throughout the executive branch as employees of their particular agency, the
OCE could appoint designated corporate ethics officials (“DCEOs”) who are
employees of the individual corporation with concurrent duties to oversee
the OCE mandate.333 The duties of DCEO’s would be similar to those of
OGE DAEOs.
These duties would include liaising with the OCE; providing advice and
counsel to prospective, current, and former corporate officers regarding
t/NavigationMenu/ForThePublic/FAQ/default.htm#taxes [https://perma.cc/7JXX-KQVW]
(last visited Jan. 6, 2020) (explaining that the State Bar of Texas is funded through means
such as membership fees and advertising income and does not receive tax dollars).
330. See discussion supra Part II (distinguishing corporate management from learned
professions, such as law and medicine, and their knowledge, certification, and ethical
requirements).
331. See supra Section III(E) (noting that the OGE consists of just seventy-five
employees).
332. See supra Section III(E) (listing the four main divisions of the OGE and their
responsibilities).
333. See supra Section III(E)(1) (discussing the various ethics responsibilities of executive
agency DAEOs and ethics officials).
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ethics laws and regulations; carrying out a required financial disclosure
program for corporate officers to detect potential conflicts of interest;
assisting the OCE with enforcement of ethics rules through the
recommendation of disciplinary or corrective action or other means, as well
as appropriate referrals to the DOJ; and providing corporate officers with
advice on ethics rules and training.334
The issue of how to conduct oversight and investigations of ethics
issues involving corporate officials outside of current SEC and DOJ
authority would have to be carefully considered. While some officials with
investigatory power may be necessary, we think creating a large number of
investigating officials similar to the U.S. government’s IG program is
unnecessary.335 Instead, DCEOs within each corporation could be
empowered by law to conduct appropriate investigations and recommend
actions as needed within their particular corporation.
4. Responsibilities of the OCE
The proposed OCE would have two primary responsibilities: 1)
preventing ethics lapses by corporations and their officers and directors; and
2) holding corporations and their officers and directors individually
accountable for ethics violations.
a. Prevention
A key responsibility of the OCE should be, first and foremost,
prevention. To that end, we propose that the OCE has the statutory
responsibility to provide ethics guidance, training, and monitoring to
designated corporate ethics officials (DCEOs) regarding ethics principles,
rules, and their application. DCEOs would be employees of the corporation.
As with executive branch DAEOs, DCEOs would need many of the same
responsibilities as DAEOs.336 This would include being authorized to be
assisted by corporate ethics advisors in carrying out the DCEO’s ethics
responsibilities.337
The DCEO and assisting corporate ethics advisors would be responsible
for providing guidance to corporate officers on all relevant ethics matters.
Similar to existing OGE procedures, corporate officers could seek ethics
334. Ethics Responsibilities of DAEOs, 5 C.F.R. § 2638.104(c) (2019).
335. See discussion supra Section III(E)(2) (noting that government IGs have many
additional duties outside of investigating ethics violations).
336. See 5 C.F.R. § 2638.104(c) for a full list of the duties of agency ethics officials.
337. 5 C.F.R. § 2638.104(e).
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advice on matters involving questions of ethics compliance and if having
done so, receive a level of personal immunity from adverse actions in
implementing the ethics advisor’s advice, should that occur.338
The OCE would also have a training responsibility similar to the OGE.
This would include the responsibility to provide detailed ethics training to
DCEOs and their staffs. 339 Additionally, OCE legal authority should require
that corporate officers receive ethics training initially, periodically (at least
annually), and under other circumstances as necessary while undertaking
their duties. These ethics training requirements should be very robust and
could be tailored from the government’s ethics education requirements.340
This training would be tailored depending on the roles and responsibilities
of the corporate officers. Certainly, all senior corporate officers, as well as
corporate officers involved in finance or other corporate areas with a high
risk for conflicts of interest would be required to have more extensive and
frequent training.341
DCEOs and ethics advisors also need the authority to monitor ethics
compliance by corporate officers. This would require legal authority to
access the information necessary to assist corporate officials with their
ethical duties by providing advice, as well as allow ethics advisors to detect
potential ethics violations. The authorizing legislation should also mandate
execution of a financial disclosure program covering senior corporate
officers and high-risk conflict of interest positions.342 A byproduct of the
OCE’s monitoring authority would be to deter unethical behavior and
encourage corporate officers to seek ethics advice, especially for areas where
ethics issues may be complex. In sum, the fundamental statutory goal of the
OCE’s legal authority should be the prevention of ethics violations through
338. Ethics Advice Rule, 5 C.F.R. § 2635.107 (2019).
339. 5 C.F.R. § 2638.104(e).
340. See Initial Ethics Training, 5 C.F.R. § 2638.304 (2019) (requiring that ethics training
consist of a presentation on specified ethics laws and regulations as well as additional written
materials).
341. This proposed requirement is somewhat similar to ethics education rules for senior
agency leaders and those required to file annual financial disclosure information. See Ethics
Briefing for Agency Leaders, 5 C.F.R. § 2638.305 (2019) (mandating additional disclosure
of any newly-acquired financial interests by certain agency heads).
342. This could be similar to existing executive branch rules mandating persons required
to file financial disclosure information. See Confidential Financial Disclosure Reports, 5
C.F.R. § 2638.205 (2019) (establishing procedures for the collection of confidential financial
reports from executive branch employees). The OCE could be organized to have a division
similar to the OGE Financial Disclosure Branch with responsibility for executing and
monitoring the program. See AGENCY PROFILE, supra note 276, at 17 (“[FDB] ensures that
senior government leaders are free of conflicts of interest by reviewing and analyzing their
public financial disclosure reports following certification by agency ethics officials.”).
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advice, training, and monitoring such that the OCE’s secondary goal of
accountability would ideally only need to be executed sparingly.
b. Personal Accountability
As has been noted, individual accountability is the critical component
of a successful ethics enforcement system.343 As such, the OCE should be
empowered to conduct ethics investigations as necessary to determine
whether corporate officers have violated ethics rules. This, of course, would
not entail any duties already the legal responsibility of the Department of
Justice.344 We do not propose creation of corporate inspectors general with
similar responsibilities to government IGs, as the responsibilities of
government IGs are too broad.345 Instead, most routine investigations could
be conducted by corporate DCEO’s and ethics advisors; the same advisors
whose primary responsibility is prevention.346
Although there are many ways in which a system of investigation and
accountability for corporate ethics violations might be designed and
structured, one option would be to enable a corporation’s ethics advisors to
investigate routine ethics matters internally, with the results of such
investigations provided to the DCEO. Each DCEO would then be
empowered to make recommendations on whether an ethics violation
occurred and recommend an appropriate disciplinary remedy. Depending on
the case, the DCEO would be authorized to turn the matter over to an
appropriate senior corporate officer for action, or in the case where a senior
corporate officer is involved in an ethics violation, turn the matter over
directly to the OCE. Cases involving violations of criminal law would be
required to be reported to the Department of Justice for action.347 Given the
high risk of conflicts of interest in corporations reporting their own officers’
ethics violations, DCEOs would need statutory protections preventing

343. See Saft, supra note 306 and accompanying text (emphasizing the need for ethics
regulations in the financial sector and “dire consequences for those who breach them” in order
to effectively limit self-interest).
344. See Enforcement, supra note 195 (listing the DOJ’s enforcement powers over
violations of ethics statutes and regulations, including criminal prosecution and disciplinary
actions).
345. The IG Act’s purposes also include audits, investigations, and recommendations
regarding the effectiveness and efficiency of government programs. IG Act § 2. This paper
does not advocate any OCE responsibility for similar purposes, as the free market typically
serves the purpose of effectuating effective and efficient corporate operations.
346. See supra Section IV(A)(4)(a) (discussing DCEOs’ roles in preventing ethics lapses
by corporations and their officers and directors).
347. Enforcement, supra note 195.
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reprisals against them in cases of reporting outside corporate channels.348
Certain firewalls and other structural and legal protections would need to be
available to DCEOs to maintain their independence, avoid conflicts of
interest, and prevent retaliation. Importantly, mechanisms that would
prevent incentivizing DCEOs and their staffs from not investigating would
be critical. Ideas might include creating certain compensation rules for these
individuals. Lastly, mechanisms allowing OCE ethics officials to directly
investigate in cases referred to it by DCEOs would be critical. As such,
investigators from an investigation branch within the OCE could lead and
conduct investigations requiring a higher level of scrutiny or involving highlevel corporate officers.
We do not argue that every corporate employee would be personally
monitored by and accountable to the OCE. Given the number of publicly
traded companies and their employees, such an undertaking is unnecessary
and unwieldy. The accountable individuals should only be higher-level
officers and directors, those “quasi-professional” managers that we argue
should be held personally accountable for ethical conduct.349 The current
SEC definitions of “executive officer” and “director” provide workable
definitions for the types of individuals who could be held accountable for
ethical violations under the OCE.350 The goal of the OCE would be to help
improve ethical management of publicly held companies, not to ensure that
every employee of every publicly held company behaves ethically.

348. A number of current statutes protect individuals who report fraud or violations of the
law by a corporation or corporate official. See e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 806, 18
U.S.C. § 1514A (2016) (providing an anti-retaliation provision for whistleblowers who report
suspected legal violations by their employers); False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h) (2012)
(protecting employees and contractors who oppose a company’s fraudulent claims from
retaliatory or discriminatory employment actions). See also 18 U.S.C. § 1513(e) (making
retaliation against a whistleblower a criminal offense).
349. See discussion supra Section II(D) (maintaining that officers and directors of
influential public companies should be regulated by ethics standards similar to those of
learned professions).
350. See Regulation D Terms, 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(f) (2019) (“Executive officer shall
mean the president, any vice president in charge of a principal business unit, division or
function (such as sales, administration or finance), any other officer who performs a policy
making function, or any other person who performs similar policy making functions for the
issuer. Executive officers of subsidiaries may be deemed executive officers of the issuer if
they perform such policy making functions for the issuer.”). See also SEC Definitions, 17
C.F.R. § 230.405 (2019) (“[D]irector means any director of a corporation or any person
performing similar functions with respect to any organization whether incorporated or
unincorporated.”).
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c. Corrective and Disciplinary Actions
Most corrective and disciplinary actions against corporate officers for
ethics violation could be structured in a manner similar to those available to
government agencies.351 Options include the use of non-punitive corrective
actions similar to those authorized under existing OGE regulations, such as
changing the employee’s assignment, ordering the employee to divest
conflicting assets, terminating the offending activity, counseling, or
restitution by the employee.352 As with OGE corrective action, corrective
actions responses would be intended to prevent the violation from occurring
in the future.353
Also similarly to the OGE’s approach, disciplinary actions against
corporate officers for ethics violations could be established by regulation and
include reprimands, suspensions, demotions, and removal (i.e.,
termination).354 The corporation would make corporate officers and
employees aware of these options as part of the corporation’s overall ethics
training efforts. With regard to terminations specifically, although
traditional “at-will” doctrine allows for termination regardless of the existing
of any accompanying statutory or regulatory authority,355 the creation of
specific authority in this area, including procedural due process standards,
could serve to insulate the DCEO and the corporations against potential
litigation liability for wrongful termination.356
One way in which an OCE should be different than the OGE is that
corrective and disciplinary action should also include potential penalties
similar to those found in the securities laws. This would include: 1) the
imposition of fines; and 2) injunctive relief, namely a permanent or
temporary bar from serving as an officer or director of a publicly traded
351. See discussion supra Section III(D)(2) (listing the sanctions for violating OGE
standards, including civil penalties, corrective actions, and disciplinary actions).
352. See supra Section III(D)(2)(b) (discussing the procedures for corrective action
responses).
353. See supra Section III(D)(2)(b) (citing the statutory definition of “corrective action”
as an action necessary to “prevent a continuing violation” of the OGE Standards).
354. See supra Section III(D)(2)(c) (noting that disciplinary actions can range from “lesser
disciplinary actions” to “more severe adverse actions”).
355. Employment at Will, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990).
356. See At-Will Employment and Wrongful Termination, FINDLAW (Dec. 5, 2018),
https://employment.findlaw.com/losing-a-job/at-will-employment-and-wrongful-termination
.html [https://perma.cc/58YW-XU5N] (“[W]rongful termination includes terminations that
violate a state’s public policy, terminations after an implied contract for employment has been
established, and terminations in violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. Wrongful termination also includes terminations in violation of federal, state, or
local anti-discrimination laws.”).
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company.357 Unlike most government employees, most officers and
directors of publicly traded companies earn substantial incomes for their
efforts. Thus, an important deterrent is monetary penalties for particularly
egregious behaviors that violate the ethical standards set by the OCE.
In line with the focus on individual accountability, we also recommend
that such penalties be expressly non-indemnifiable by the corporation. For
true accountability, it is important that the bad actors themselves bear the
cost of their actions and not the corporation and its shareholders. The
ultimate deterrent the OCE should possess is the officer and director bar. An
important aspect of professional regulation is the potential to lose your
ability to practice that profession if you are found to be unfit to do so.358 For
very wealthy and highly paid individuals, the potential sanction of being
prevented from continuing to operate as an officer or director is a very
important deterrent to unethical conduct.
d. No Private Cause of Action
Ideally, no private causes of action would be created under the OCE.
The goal of the OCE would be to provide a mechanism for ethical behavior
to be adequately policed, not to compensate victims. Sufficient private
causes of actions already exist for most of the harms that might occur, and
to create a private cause of action under any OCE statute or regulation would
run the risk of simply encouraging enterprising plaintiff’s lawyers to attempt
to sue executives for any conduct they deem to be unethical. Such a structure
follows the quasi-professional formulation that we advocate. For example,
a doctor can be sued by his clients under general tort law if he commits
malpractice. However, any professional sanctions related to competency
would be determined by the board under which he is licensed. Similarly,
while we envision an OCE that could have a mechanism for private
individuals to contact the OCE to report allegedly unethical conduct that
357. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-3(f) (2012) (providing for a temporary or permanent officer and
director bar for violations of section 78j(b) of the Exchange Act or any of its rules or
regulations). See also id. § 78u-2(a) (giving the SEC authority to assess money penalties in
administrative proceedings); id. § 78ff(c) (providing for various monetary penalties for
violations of securities laws).
358. See Rakesh Khurana, Nitin Nohria & Daniel Penrice, Is Business Management a
Profession?, HARV. BUS. SCH.: WORKING KNOWLEDGE (Feb. 21, 2005), https://hbswk.hbs.ed
u/item/is-business-management-a-profession [https://perma.cc/7SZ2-52SJ] (“A governing
body, composed of respected members of the profession, oversees adherence to the code by
establishing monitoring mechanisms, reviewing complaints, and administering sanctions—
including the ultimate sanction of revoking an individual’s license to operate as a
professional.”).
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might violate OCE regulations or to even file a grievance with the OCE, we
do not believe that a private cause of action seeking damages would be a
productive way to police ethical behavior.
5. Standards of Conduct for U.S. Corporate Officers
As was noted earlier, many of the basic obligations of public service of
executive branch employees are directly applicable and easily transferable to
the ethical obligations of corporate officers. 359 It is, nonetheless, worthwhile
to list the principles substituting the words “corporate officer” for the
existing word “employee”:
1. Requiring corporate officers to place loyalty to the law and ethical
principles above private gain;
2. Prohibiting corporate officers from holding financial interests that
conflict with their performance of duty;
3. Prohibiting corporate officers from engaging in financial
transactions using nonpublic information or allowing the improper
use of such information to further any private interests;
4. Prohibiting corporate officers, except as specifically allowed by
other regulation, from soliciting or accepting any gift or other item
of monetary value from any person or entity seeking official action
from, doing business with, or conducting activities regulated by the
employee’s organization;
5. Requiring corporate officers to put forth honest effort in the
performance of their duties;
6. Prohibiting corporate officers from using their position for private
gain;
7. Requiring corporate officers to protect and conserve property and
not use it for other than authorized activities;
8. Prohibiting corporate officers from engaging in outside
employment or activities, including seeking or negotiating for
employment, that conflict with that officer’s official duties and
responsibilities;
9. Requiring corporate officers to disclose waste, fraud, abuse, and
corruption to appropriate authorities; and
10. Requiring corporate officers to endeavor to avoid any actions
creating the appearance that they are violating the law or ethical
standards.360
359. Obligation Public Service, 5 C.F.R. § 2635.101(b)(1)–(5), (7), (9)–(11), (14) (2019).
360. Id.
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Additionally, in order to implement these principles, a set of Standards
of Ethical Conduct for U.S. Corporate Officers could be created by
rulemaking. These could be the subset of the standards of ethical conduct
for executive branch employees discussed above361 and would, among other
potential rules, include those dealing with conflicts of financial interests,
gifts, impartiality in advancing corporate interests, and corporate officer
misuse of position and corporate information for personal gain.362
In-line with the quasi-professional regulatory nature of our proposed
OCE, we propose that the ethical standards used expressly incorporate the
numerous criminal and civil statutes applicable to corporate officers and
directors as a “catch-all” for ethical behavior. It is difficult to argue that
ethical business management does not encompass following applicable laws.
However, as previously discussed, many of the laws that have been passed
that regulate corporate governance and ethical management issues do not
have adequate enforcement mechanisms for individual accountability.363 By
incorporating relevant existing legal violations into standards of behavior
under the OCE, the OCE can give much needed teeth to existing violations.
To illustrate how this might work, we can return to a previous example
of an executive accused of a pattern of sexual harassment.364 Suppose that
the corporation has continued to either pay judgments or confidential
settlements on behalf of the executive. If an OCE investigator is allowed to
investigate and use its enforcement powers related to the same conduct and
considers the conduct to be a violation of ethical management standards,
there is actual personal accountability at stake. Now the OCE could either
fine the executive himself or temporarily or permanently bar the executive
from serving as an officer or director of a publicly traded company. This
would treat corporate officers and directors similarly to other professionals
who can be deemed unfit to practice their profession due to certain violations
of the law.365

361. See supra Section III(C) for a full discussion of OGE ethics standards that could be
made applicable to corporate officers and employees.
362. See supra Section III(C) (discussing specified ethical conduct requirements listed in
the OGE Standards). See also 5 C.F.R. § 2635.
363. See discussion supra Part I (discussing the inadequacy of current securities and
corporate governance laws with respect to policing corporate ethics at the individual level).
364. See Uber to pay $1.9M for sexual harassment claims, supra note 4 (reporting on
several sexual harassment and discrimination claims against Uber brought by fifty-six current
and former employees).
365. See generally TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. tit. 2, subtit. G, app. B, § 1.06(CC) (West 2018)
(defining “professional misconduct” as including conviction of a “serious crime” or an
“intentional crime”).
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6. Implementation of an OCE
Creation of an OCE as this paper describes is a substantial task. One
option for consideration would be to create and legally authorize the OCE
structure and authorities and then phase in corporations for legal coverage,
starting with the largest public corporations, or at least a subset of them.
How this would be decided would be subject to debate, but one option would
be to first phase in corporations in the Fortune 500366 or Fortune 1000.367
The OCE itself need not be a sizeable government agency. OCE
legislation should require each corporation covered by the legislation to have
a DCEO with direct reporting responsibilities to the OCE. Just as with OGE
DAEOs and ethics advisors, who are employees of the executive agencies, a
DCEO could be hired by each corporation with overall responsibility for
leading and managing the corporation’s ethics program efforts. This would
include coordinating ethics oversight, training, and compliance within the
corporation. Careful thought of potential conflicts of interest with DCEOs
due to their status as corporate employees would need to be undertaken with
a view to creating mitigation mechanisms. Protection of DCEOs from
corporate reprisals is critical. Most importantly, corporate buy-in is vital.
V. CONCLUSION
Current corporate statements about their commitment to ethics are
legion.368 Support of ethics beyond mere phrases by top-level corporate
366. Fortune magazine ranks the top 500 U.S. companies (public and private) by total
revenue based on their 10-K filings. Adam Hayes, Fortune 500, INVESTOPEDIA (Jun. 25,
2019), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/fortune500.asp [https://perma.cc/BBN8-RER
3].
367. This list by Fortune magazine ranks US public corporations based on revenues
generated from core operations, discounted operations, and consolidated subsidiaries. The
Fortune 500 list is more often used because of the rapid turnover of companies near the bottom
of the Fortune 1000 list. James Chen, Fortune 1000, INVESTOPEDIA (Sept. 22, 2019), https://
www.investopedia.com/terms/f/fortune-1000.asp#:~:targetText=The%20Fortune%201000%
20is%20an,discounted%20operations%2C%20and%20consolidated%20subsidiaries [https://
perma.cc/S5BB-MWSL].
368. See, e.g., Internal Policy, Facebook, Code of Conduct 1 (June 10, 2019),
https://s21.q4cdn.com/399680738/files/doc_downloads/governance_documents/2019/Codeof-Conduct-(June-10-2019).pdf [https://perma.cc/JL83-4WD6] (“Employees of Facebook,
Inc., or any of its affiliates or subsidiaries (“Facebook”) . . . are expected to act lawfully,
honestly, ethically, and in the best interests of the company while performing duties on behalf
of Facebook.”); Internal Policy, Bank of Am. Corp., Code of Ethics ii. (Dec. 2013),
https://www.banktrack.org/download/code_of_ethics_20/190318code_of_ethics_dec2013.p
df [https://perma.cc/3XJ6-D65D] (“Each of us is accountable for upholding the highest ethical
standards as we execute our responsibilities. Managers and leaders are also responsible for
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executives is a must and should be demonstrated by action.369 While the
internal support of ethical conduct by corporate leaders is valuable, if the
stated commitment to ethics of most corporations is genuine, corporate
leaders should be able to see the long-term value of improving it: value to
their reputation, value to their stockholders and customers, and value to their
profitability.
Knee-jerk reactions against change belie this stated
commitment. The authors hope to avoid such reactions with this proposal—
not minimizing the task creating an OCE would entail but engendering real
conversation about a genuine problem.
It is always easier to continue the status quo. There is little doubt this
proposal will be met with resistance. Substantial political will is going to be
necessary. This paper makes the case that corporate ethical behavior is
rapidly going in the wrong direction. Current attacks on the corporate system
are only further enabled by the seemingly endless ethical malfeasance by
many corporations and the inability of the current system to hold
corporations and corporate officers individually accountable. The de facto
ineffectiveness of stockholder enforcement options and the rapid decline of
criminal prosecution of corporations and its officers has led to the current
establishing and nurturing a culture in which employees feel fully empowered, supported and
obligated to do the right thing.”). See also Sean T. Johnston, Ford Named One of the World’s
Most Ethical Companies for Eighth Straight Year, FORD: FORDSOCIAL, https://social.ford.co
m/en_US/story/ford-community/awards/ford-named-one-the-worlds-most-ethical-companie
s-for-eighth-straight-year.html [https://perma.cc/BYM8-LAVW] (last visited Jan. 2, 2020)
(“‘Strong ethics and corporate citizenship are the foundation of our business philosophy,
which demonstrates to our customers what we stand for as a company,’ said Bill Ford, Ford
Motor Company Executive Chairman.”).
369. Many possible steps and activities to demonstrate corporate officer commitment are
possible. Among the actions one author lists actions are:
1) Integration of ethics and compliance at business meetings; 2) Specific decision
where a CEO or senior executives explain that ethical principles transcend shortterm financial gain from a business opportunity; 3) Commitment to training and
certifications by volunteering to complete training before other managers and
employees; 4) Speaking before small groups (e.g. new employee orientation to
emphasize importance of ethics and compliance; 5) Written newsletters, videos,
postings on the intranet portal, and updated materials (more than once a year)
explaining importance of ethics and compliance and commitment to hearing and
responding to employee concerns, questions, and comments; 6) Symbolic acts of
commitment to ethics and compliance such as small group meetings to listen to
employee concerns, follow up on issues learned from employees, and
communications of efforts to address employee concerns; [and] 7) Familiarity
with the company’s code of conduct, citation of provisions in company meetings
and statements of support.
Michael Volkov, Walking the Walk and Talking the Talk–A CEO’s Commitment to Ethics and
Compliance, VOLKOV (Feb. 6, 2017), https://blog.volkovlaw.com/2017/02/walking-walktalking-talk-ceos-commitment-ethics-compliance/ [https://perma.cc/W588-D3KR].
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practice of opening up the corporate checkbook. The paying of penalties and
fines with stockholder assets and the creation of attendant tax consequences
to the U.S. taxpayers are not the answer. Neither is the current focus of
corporate self-regulation of its own ethical behavior.
Although President John F. Kennedy in his famous 1962 speech at Rice
University specifically addressed the moon landing program, his words are
apropos here: “We choose to . . . do the other things, not because they are
easy, but because they are hard.”370 Creating a U.S. Office of Corporate
Ethics will be hard. But it is a visionary endeavor that if done right, would
be well worth the effort and cost in terms of its benefits to stabilizing and
creating an enduring corporate free market system less subject to criticism
and attack and more responsive to the needs of stockholders, stakeholders,
and the public.

370. President John F. Kennedy, Address at Rice University on the Nation’s Space Effort
(Sept. 12, 1962).

